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Understanding Armenian identity, what shapes it and why, is necessary for 
understanding the Republic of Armenia. For it is this identity and its preservation that 
motivates the Republic of Armenia to create certain policies that agitate for measures that 
ultimately either improve or threaten stability within the Southern Caucasus as well as 
Armenian relations with the international community.  This thesis utilizes the lens of 
memory to trace the evolution of Armenian identity through the Russian Imperialist, 
Soviet, and post-Soviet periods of Armenian history, seeking new ways to analyze and 
understand the factors that influence the formation of national narratives and to what end.  
It will explore the expansion of Russia into Armenian life, society, and culture and how 
this affected the ways in which Armenians were perceived and treated by the Empire.  
Imperialist perceptions, policies, and actions impacted Armenians’ understanding of 
themselves in the pre-Soviet era and ultimately created an environment that gave rise to 
an Armenian nationalism and its quest for nationhood.  Furthermore, Armenian life in the 
Soviet Union and the influence of lingering memories of communism and the Soviet 
 vi 
experience on the formation of Soviet and post-Soviet Armenian identity, as well as the 
post-Soviet resurgence and re-appropriation of historic memories and the reconstruction 
of a national identity grounded in ideals of historic exceptionalism, reunification, and 
self-determination, will be discussed. 
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How has identity shifted and evolved over the course of the last two hundred 
years for Armenians residing in Russia and the territory of modern-day Armenia? More 
to the point, what role has individual, social, and collective memory had in the 
development of contemporary Armenian identity? Due to the long-standing 
fragmentation of the Armenian people and their dispersal throughout the world over the 
course of their history, attempting to classify and distinguish a unique form of identity for 
this group would indeed be a difficult task.  Commonalities are clearly discernable, such 
as a shared collective identity of an ancient past, language, religion, and a deep 
connection to the tragic events surrounding what is considered by many to be a genocide 
of the Armenian people in Eastern Anatolia at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
However, ‘Armenian identity’ is in actuality as fragmented as the Armenian people.  It is 
evident that a distinguishable split exists between what is considered the eastern 
diaspora—those communities in Russia, Iran, and Armenia proper—and what is 
considered the western diaspora—those communities in Europe, the Middle East, and the 
Americas.  This disjunction is based on differences of linguistic dialects, religious 
leadership, politics, and geography.  Due to the vast scope inherent in synthesizing such 
diverse characteristics, this study will focus exclusively on Armenian communities of 
Russia and modern-day Armenia.  By tracing the development and evolution of memory 
and identity through three critical periods—the Russian Imperial period, the Soviet era, 
and the post-Soviet period—I will illustrate how eastern Armenian identity contributes to 
the ongoing geopolitical relationship between the Republic of Armenia and Russia. 
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Karl W. Deutsch defines three phases of nationalism, or ethnic mobilization, 
through a lens of communication. 1 The first level is the formation of a people united by 
language, culture, geography, and goals.  The second level is the creation of a nationality 
by which a people seek “to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its 
members…to equip itself with power…to make the enforcement of its commands 
sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them.”2 
Thus, people begin to develop a national consciousness that leads to the emergence of 
nationalism.  The third level is the creation of a fully operational and healthy nation or 
nation-state, which is typically the goal of nationalism. This path of ethnic mobilization 
can be clearly seen in the Armenian quest for independence over the past few centuries.   
Following Deutsch’s model, Chapter 1 will focus on the expansion of Russia into 
Armenian life, society, and culture; the ways in which Armenians were perceived and 
treated by the Empire; and how those perceptions, policies, and actions impacted 
Armenians’ understanding of themselves in the pre-Soviet era in order to understand the 
formation of the Armenians as a people, rise of Armenian nationalism, and the quest for 
Armenian nationhood.  Specifically, this chapter will discuss their socioeconomic 
standing within the Russian Empire through shifting lenses of ethnicity, roles and 
functions, and mobility or ‘freedom.’ More importantly, the perception of this standing in 
relation to that under previous empires will help to shed light on the production, 
evolution, and promulgation of various narratives affecting historical memory and its 
impact on identity.  We will also see the beginnings of an attempt to unify scattered 
Armenian groups by the creation and promotion of a national identity that crosses 
                                                
1 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
2 Ibid, 78. 
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territorial borders and uses anti-Turkish sentiment and victimhood, largely based in 
memories of genocide, as symbolic tools of memory.   
Chapter 2 will examine Armenian life in the Soviet Union and the influence of 
lingering memories of communism and the Soviet experience on the formation of Soviet 
and post-Soviet Armenian identity.  This period had a distinct impact on those living 
under communism, contributing to the furthering fissure of Armenian identity along 
eastern and western lines—corresponding to the initial split of the Armenian people 
between the Persian and Ottoman Empires respectively—and bolstering of 
socioeconomic and geopolitical bonds between Russia and Armenia.  By understanding 
the motives, methods, and level of acceptance of competing narratives and Soviet 
assimilation, we will better understand the implications this process had on Armenian 
identity.  
Lastly, Chapter 3 will explore the post-Soviet resurgence and re-appropriation of 
historic, pre-Soviet memories and the construction (or reconstruction) of a new national 
identity grounded in ideals of historic exceptionalism, reunification, and self-
determination. This section will analyze the impetuses for renewed nationalism and the 
utilization and exploitation of a triumphalist past to shape the Armenian future.  By 
deconstructing memories of victimhood, internalization of pre-Soviet and Soviet 
memories, and various narratives existing in tension in the immediate years following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, I will attempt to elucidate post-Soviet identity through the 
lens of Memory Studies.    
THEMES AND CONCEPTS 
 Individual memory and collective memory are inseparable sides of the same 
memory coin.  Both private individual memory and public collective memory combine to 
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make up what we might call living memory, or one’s lived experiences.  Likewise, 
memory and history cannot be separated if one wishes to comprehensively understand 
those lived experiences of an individual, group, or people.  The existing scholarship on 
memory and history is extensive and constantly evolving.  New voices from all fields of 
academia are contributing to these concepts and changing the way we think about the role 
of memory in history. This field of history and memory is quite large and spans many 
disciplines, hence the necessity to synthesize differing concepts and definitions. 
Following will be an overview of some of the major contributions to this field and how 
they relate to the role of memory and history in the shaping of Armenian identity over 
time.    
 Beginning with a discussion of basic theories and themes, a close look at various 
articles that have appeared in academic journals over the past decade or two offers some 
definitions and debates in this thought-provoking field of History and Memory Studies.3  
First of all, it is important to make the distinction between history and memory. 
Memories are the events that happened while history is subjective and based on the 
importance that historians place upon it.4 Pierre Nora makes a compelling argument for 
the use of what he calls lieux de memoire, or sites of memory, by claiming that the state 
actually creates sites of memory—for example statues, memorials, symbols, etc.—as a 
way to impose memory on its citizenry, thus arguing that memory does not occur 
naturally but springs forth from subjective history.  Adding to Nora’s work, Richard 
Roberts encompasses the theme of statist as well as anti-statist intervention in the 
                                                
3 In their article “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of 
Mnemonic Practices,” Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins reconstruct some working definitions relating to 
social memory in order to synthesize the multi-disciplinary scholarship that has contributed to this field. 
4 See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (Spring, 
1989): 7-24. 
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production of history and memory.5  Namely, national projects reproduce statist, 
hegemonic forms of productions of history while they affect an alternative position. 
These concepts of competing narratives that exist within tension to one another are 
important to keep in mind when analyzing various memories and histories and how their 
internalization into the minds of the Armenian diaspora have changed over time. It is also 
necessary to distinguish social memory from collective memory.  Social memory is a tool 
used to understand the intersection of social identity and historical memory. Whereas 
collective memory groups together a number of social groups; social memory evokes the 
social frameworks within which individuals and societies form group identity and 
negotiate competing recollections of the past. 6 These memories exist within the larger 
collective, thus a collective narrative can often dismiss or exclude narratives of some 
social groups while emphasizing others.  When referring to certain groups within the 
larger Armenian collective, I will be referring to social memory in order to make the 
distinction that not all groups within the collective or nation carry the same memories.  
The late 1970s led to an interpretive form of narrative and marks the beginning of a focus 
on broader social and collective forces placed in a cultural context rather than on 
individual remembrances.7 Extrapolating from this theory, viewing collective memory in 
a cultural context aids in understanding the motives behind the appropriation of certain 
individual histories as national myths.  Thus, perhaps ‘cultural memory’ is an appropriate 
lens through which to view the appropriation and use of certain Armenian memories.8   
                                                
5 See Richard Roberts, “History, Memory, and the Power of Statist Narratives,” The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): 513-522. 
6 Scot A. French, “What is Social Memory?” Southern Cultures 2, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 9-18. 
7 Anna Green's article, “Individual Remembering and 'Collective Memory': Theoretical Presuppositions 
and Contemporary Debates,” traces the epistemological course of historians. 
8 Another group of scholars that have contributed heavily to defining the concepts of history and memory 
can be traced back to two journals, the twenty-sixth special issue of Representations in 1989 and the 
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 Another important component to Memory Studies involves the role of nostalgia in 
the creation, diffusion, and use of memories.  Anthropologist Renato Rosaldo argues that 
colonial nostalgia is not benevolent but stems from an imperial past reminiscent of 
domination and subordination.9 Colonial narratives tend to lump together all individual 
and social memories into one single narrative.  This ultimately contributes to the 
forgetting and silencing of some memories while disseminating only one.  Thus, nostalgia 
becomes dangerous when failing to recognize those ‘lost’ memories, as it denies the past 
of certain groups of society.  Rosaldo argues that it is important to consider ethnographic 
writings in relation to imperialism and colonization so as not to discount these silenced 
memories. But how does a past of imperialism result in nostalgia among an Armenian 
diaspora? I would argue that there are various manifestations of ‘imperialist nostalgia’ 
not only for the Russian Empire, but also for the Soviet Union. Additionally, it is 
necessary to view these nostalgias in terms of ‘victimhood,’ but also collaboration.  Thus 
a question arises as to how the lingering consciousness of victimhood and subjugation 
result in a desire to claim a triumphalist past in order to create a triumphalist future? 
Furthermore, how does nostalgia differ between diaspora communities in Russia from 
those who remained in traditional Armenian territory? 
 Experience is crucial to distinguishing between collective memory—lived 
experiences—and historical memory—the preservation of lived experiences.  Historical 
memory is the “lived experience of recalling and remembering the past in the living, 
active present.”10 This follows Nora in stating that the preservation of historical memory 
                                                                                                                                            
December 1997 issue of American Historical Review.  The former of these feature Pierre Nora, Renato 
Rosaldo, and Steven Knapp, while the latter feature Susan A. Crane and Alon Confino. 
9 See Renato Rosaldo, “Imperialist Nostalgia.” Representations 26 (Spring, 1989): 107-122. 
10 Susan A. Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory,” American Historical Review 
102, no. 5 (Dec. 1997): 1373. 
 7 
inevitable corrupts the memory of lived experiences.  Taking this into consideration, how 
then does the forced preservation of certain historical memories—for example the 
Armenian Genocide—and their subsequent imbedding into the national narrative by the 
state change or skew individual memories? The emphasis on selective ‘sites of memory’ 
and rituals designed to evoke or strengthen ‘historical’ memories lead to selective 
forgetting and exploitation of lived experiences.   In order to resuscitate collective 
memory, it is necessary to relocate “the collective back into the individual who articulates 
it”11 and pay attention to how individuals experience themselves as historical figures. 
Thus, it is also necessary to view collective memories through those of the individual in 
order to mitigate a skewed perspective.  To that end, this study will use individual 
memories of select figures to analyze how statist narratives have influenced those 
memories and how these figures themselves (and individual memory) have become 
imbedded in a national narrative.   
 Social, political, and economic forces contribute heavily to the production of 
history.12 Thus, how do disparate and shifting political, economic, and social or cultural 
pressures contribute to the rise of certain statist and counter-narratives? Furthermore, 
what are the motives and usages behind what is remembered and what is forgotten? 
Ritual performances convey and maintain images of the past.13  Thus, acts of memory 
become acts of various performances, both consciously and unconsciously performed at 
various levels, and are connected to ideas of race, gender, class, and the power of 
                                                
11 Ibid, p.1379-1380. 
12 David William Cohen's The Combing of History examines the conventions and paradigms that govern 
historical knowledge and historical texts. 
13 Another important contribution to the scholarship of memory, and useful for this study, arises from 
Marianne Hirsch and Valerie Smith.  Their article “Feminism and Cultural Memory: An Introduction” uses 
Paul Connerton’s definition of cultural memory as an ‘act of transfer.’  Connerton’s How Societies 
Remember concentrates on understanding memory, especially cultural memory, as an ‘act of transfer.’ 
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authoritative institutions to choose what to remember and what to forget.14  For this 
reason, an in-depth analysis of rituals of remembrance and performances of memory and 
forgetting, as well as their connection to concepts of participation and agency, will be a 
significant focus of this thesis. 
 In his book On Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs asserts that human 
memory cannot be divorced from a collective context.  Disparate groups of people have 
distinctive collective memories.  Thus, varying modes of behavior rise out of these 
different memories. The individual cannot exist outside of some kind of collective, 
therefore individual memory does not exist outside of the collective. Another approach to 
the relationship between history and memory that should be considered derives from Paul 
Ricoeur.  He approaches memory from a phenomenological perspective, focusing on how 
a memory of the present can be an abstract of something from the past.15 Memory must 
be grounded in a particular context or place, thus it is necessary to historicize it to 
understand what is forgotten and what is remembered.  In order to examine the role and 
influence of both individual and collective memory on the formulation of Armenian 
identity, I will explore how statist, religious, and alternative narratives of national myths 
and histories have changed over time.  It will be important to contextualize these 
memories in the larger historical narrative of Armenian history as well as to delineate 
collective memory from historical memory.  To examine how Armenians’ past inhabit 
their present memories, remembrances, and lived experiences, the notion of chronosophy 
is important to keep in mind as it refers to viewing time as relative.  A chronosophical 
perspective treats the past as inhabiting the present through the use of memory.  Thus, 
                                                
14 Marianne Hirsch and Valerie Smith, “Feminism and Cultural Memory: An Introduction.” Signs, Special 
Issue 28, 1, Gender and Cultural Memory (Autumn 2002): 1-19. 
15 See Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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when an individual ‘relives’ the past through remembering, that event lives on in the 
present.  This notion rejects a chronological paradigm and refuses to view events and 
memories of those events through linear space. Specifically, how do individual, social, 
and collective memories of the past continue to lived on and color the present? 
 Ultimately, the importance of documents, place, and time when contextualizing 
and analyzing memory are themes that must be considered when conducting memory 
work.16 In discussing the role of narratives, I found Richard Roberts extremely helpful in 
understanding the roles and differences of statist and alternative narratives. Paying due 
attention to whom a narrative benefits is a key component that must be considered when 
looking at Russian, Ottoman, and Armenian archives maintained by their respective 
states since archives can be manipulated or even fabricated to maintain the legitimacy 
and narrative of the state or power structure.17  Taking this into consideration, it will be 
necessary to look at those archival documents with a critical eye.  In addition, examining 
memoirs and travelogues through a Halbwachs-ian lens will help to distinguish the 
varying memories that arise from different groups—for example those Armenians living 
in Russia, those living in present-day Armenia, and those living in the Ottoman Empire—
with an eye to how they have changed over time. 
                                                
16 Helena Pohlandt-McCormick questions the veracity of testimonies and archives in “Controlling Woman: 
Winnie Mandela and the 1976 Soweto Uprising.”  She argues that the state creates archives and corrupts 
the original evidence; therefore those documents become untrustworthy.  She also examines the role of the 
audience, stating that since it can change, testimonies could be made with that audience in mine.  Thus, 
tainted history becomes tainted memory. Additionaly, Ruramisai Charumbira offers a much-needed 
discussion on the importance of language in interacting with original source material and effectively 
presenting history as a trustworthy figure in her article “Nehanda and Gender Victimhood in the Central 
Mashonaland 1896-97 Rebellions: Revisiting the Evidence.” The role of agency is another important theme 
when discussing concepts of ‘victimhood.’ For that, an application of Ricoeur, Charumbira, and Pohlandt-
McCormick to the memoirs and travelogues will be invaluable. 
17 See Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, “Controlling Woman,” “Controlling Woman: Winnie Mandela and 
the 1976 Soweto Uprising.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, 3 (2000): 585-614. 
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The term ‘nationalism’ as used today is a relatively modern phrase used to 
express the formation of a nation, sentiments belonging exclusively to that nation, a 
nation’s language or associated symbols, a sociopolitical movement on behalf of that 
nation, or an ideology seen as belonging to or associated with that nation.18 All of these 
instances have one thing in common: the nation is of prime importance. Thus, a useful 
definition would classify nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members 
deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”19 When considering Armenian 
nationalism and its effect upon Armenian identity, it is important to take into 
consideration nationalism as it developed in the Caucasus as a whole.  In general, this can 
be described as classically postcolonial since it takes much of its character from the 
creation of distinct national categories in censuses, the demographic manufacturing of 
empire builders, and even the rise of old imperial and clerical languages.  In addition, 
alternative poles of allegiance in the north Caucasus have long had a history of competing 
with the nation for the hearts and minds of its people.20 However in Georgia, nationalism 
emerged from reworking established heritages with a focus on gathering lands that once 
belonged to an older state.  Ecclesiastical tradition and literary language, a unique writing 
system, an ancient royal house, and the willingness of conquering empires to reinforce 
noble privileges rather than supplant them meant that basic questions of identity, 
community, and territory were settled much earlier in Georgia than in other areas of the 
Caucasus.  In contrast, Azerbaijani intellectuals generally looked to national ideas as a 
                                                
18 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism 2 ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 5-6. 
19 Ibid, 9. 
20 Islam and pan-Islamist movements, and pan-Turkism for example 
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way of pulling their populations into modernity instead of searching for past glory days 
like the Georgians. 
Armenian nationalism is in part unique to this region in its use of both of these 
elements.21  It was part modernizing and part revivalist, reflecting the environment in 
which it arose.  For much of their history, the lands that would constitute the Armenian 
republic were Muslim, overseen by Muslim khans, and inhabited by Turkic-speaking 
Muslim nomads and some settled farmers.  The historic areas of Armenian life were in 
Eastern Anatolia.  The ancient city of Ani was a major site of Armenian learning and 
ecclesiastical governance before its destruction by an earthquake in the fourteenth 
century.  In addition, the highly mobile nature of Armenian populations and their 
connections with international commerce dates back to the Middle Ages and caused 
Armenian communities to thrive in places like Venice, Krakow, Istanbul, Jerusalem, and 
even Calcutta.22 Because of various territorial shifts, an inability to function as an 
independent nation, and a global dispersal of Armenians at such an early time, a 
competing image of what and where Armenia was developed within these Diaspora 
communities.   
The English-language scholarship on Armenian identity is not vast.  While several 
scholars such as Ronald Grigor Suny, Aram Arkun, and Razmik Panossian have grappled 
with classifying Armenian identity and the creation of the Armenian nation, they tend to 
reinforce a national narrative of exceptionalism by overemphasizing national myths of 
triumphalism and uniqueness.  I have yet to find any English-language studies that 
directly link the role of memory to the creation of distinct narratives that ultimately form 
one’s ‘Armenian-ness.’ It is important to note that the Armenian people have been 
                                                
21 Armenian nationalism here is used to refer to what would arise in the Armenian nation-state. 
22 Movement into Cilicia in 11th century 
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geographically dispersed for centuries.  This in turn has naturally led to the absence of 
conformity in ‘Armenian’ identity.  For that reason this study will deal almost exclusively 
with ‘Eastern Armenians’—those who inhabit the current physical space of the Republic 
of Armenia and their closest diaspora in Russia.  Armenian communities within Iran are 
also considered part of this eastern diaspora group.  However, they did not experience 
communism as members of the Soviet Union, thus forming a unique identity based on 
divergent experiences. Therefore they will not be prominently discussed for the purposes 
of this paper.   
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ARMENIAN DIASPORA 
Both modern-day and ancient Armenian homelands have long been located at the 
crossroads of East and West interests.  Making up a land bridge between the Caspian and 
Black Seas, the Caucasus region has played an important strategic role in the ambitions 
of many ancient powers by serving as a “funnel through which traders, travelers, and 
entire peoples moved.”23 Lying among Turkey to the West, Iran to the South, Azerbaijan 
to the East, and Georgia to the North, modern-day Armenia traces a rich and long history 
far back into antiquity.  The Kingdom of Armenia was first founded in 600 BC under the 
Orontid Dynasty and became one of the most powerful kingdoms in the region between 
95 and 66 BC.  Its geographic position between East and West lent itself to a natural 
highway through which many different peoples traveled.  This has meant invasion by the 
Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols, Persians, Ottoman Turks, and 
the Russians.  Each of these empires left an impression upon Armenia and its culture that 
lasts to this day since “the migrants’ identities, ranging from religion to language and 
                                                
23 Croissant, Michael P. The Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1998), 1. 
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culture, were adopted to varying degrees by the indigenous peoples of Transcaucasia.”24  
This translates to an ethnically and culturally diverse environment.  The Caucasus region 
as a whole continues to hold strategic value for both the East and West.25  Because of this 
a diverse range of cultures, religions, languages, and ethnicities have consistently 
collided, often erupting into tense battles pitting one people against another.  In the case 
of the Armenians, this mixture combusted quite fatefully during the twentieth century due 
to various pressures on social and political tensions.  
Figure 1: Map of shifting Armenian territories26  
                                                
24 Ibid, 2. 
25 The use of the term “East” here primarily symbolizes Russia, while the “West” denotes Europe and the 
United States.  The value the Caucasus region holds today for these powers lies mainly in natural resources 
(e.g. oil and natural gas), its presence as a buffer zone between Russia and both Europe (Turkey) and Iran, 
as well as a strategic military launching site against opponents in the Middle East, to name a few.   
26 Map from armenica.org. 
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Ancient Armenia stretched across vast, shifting territories [see figure 1].  At its 
greatest extent between 95 BC and 66 BC, the Armenian Kingdom extended from the 
Caspian to Mediterranean Sea.27 Beginning in the fourteenth century, Armenians fell 
under Ottoman rule and, according to Ottoman administrative practices, were able to 
enjoy a certain amount of religious, social, and governmental autonomy.  Under the millet 
system, ethnic communities were allowed to rule themselves, to a certain degree, by their 
own procedures underneath the authority of an appointed church leader. Thus, these 
religious communities were given semi-autonomous administrative power.  The first such 
leader of all Armenian subjects in the Ottoman Empire was appointed in 1461.  The 
patriarchate of Constantinople represented the Armenian millet in the Empire and 
assumed certain administrative responsibilities in their communities. In 1563, a treaty 
between France and the Ottoman Empire established broader commercial relations with 
the West.  It also introduced an agreement by the Muslim nation to grant all Christian 
powers the right to conduct their own business within the Ottoman Empire.  This 
ultimately set in motion the economic and social development of much of the Armenian 
diaspora within their host countries.  However, this would change drastically by the end 
of the Ottoman era with the Tanzimat Reforms of 1839 to 1876, by which these 
traditionally semi-autonomous peoples became legally protected religious minority 
groups.  
Under both the Ottoman and Persian Empires, minority communities like the 
Armenians were permitted a level of autonomy and could live by their own ethnic laws, 
traditions, and sometimes administrative policies. Due to its strategic location between 
Europe and Asia, the historic Armenian homeland was ideally situated for trade and a 
                                                
27 For further history on Armenia, see Simon Payaslian, The History of Armenia (New York, NY: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007). 
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natural breeding ground for merchants. Armenians have enjoyed a history as commercial 
traders throughout the world.28 This history of trade naturally lent itself to the 
establishment of trading diaspora communities throughout the world. Not only were 
Armenians heavily involved with overland trade in the Caucasus region, but they had also 
established a presence along many other routes across Eurasia as well as in maritime 
trade off the east coast of Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in the Philipines.29 This 
allowed for the construction of a disaporic-trading infrastructure that would play a large 
role in the explosion of Armenian diffusion after the genocidal pogroms of Turkey in the 
late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. 
Between 1502 and 1783, the Safavid Empire in Iran emerged and began 
threatening Ottoman rule in the region.  While the Ottoman Empire consolidated its 
power in western Armenian lands, the Safavids expanded across the Caucasus and 
conquered much of Eastern Armenia. The Treaty of Zuhab between the Ottoman and 
Safavid Empires granted a large part of historic Armenia to the Ottomans, while giving a 
smaller portion to the Persians. The large territory of the Armenian Plateau encompassing 
the regions of Lake Van, Bayazid, Kars, and Ardahan became solely Ottoman, while the 
areas around Erevan, Karabagh, Nakichivan, and Zangezur were ruled by Persia.  This 
helped to establish the beginning of a divide in Armenian development and loyalty that 
can still be seen today.  
So while this governance by foreign powers resulted in the fragmentation and 
stagnation of Armenian society and culture, Armenian trading practices were not overly 
                                                
28 H.A. Mandandian, The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade, trans. N.G. 
Garsoian (Lisbon, 1965) examines international trade routes across Armenia from 6th century BC to 15th 
century AD. 
29 Vahe Baladouni and Margaret Makepeace, “Armenian Merchants of the Seventeenth and Early 
Eighteenth Centuries: English East India Company Sources,” Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, New Series, 88/5 (1998): i-xxxvii+1-294.  
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stymied.  Due in part to religious law of the Islamic empires of Turkey and Persia, 
Armenians remained in control of much of the commerce during these eras.  The 
Armenian communities in Julfa and along the Araxes River particularly were perceived 
as “brokers and representatives of European commercial firms and interests in the silk 
and cloth trades.”30 These Armenians garnered such a large reputation that Shah Abbas of 
the Safavid Empire forcibly deported these communities to Persia—peasants driven to 
silk-growing provinces while others were settled outside of Isfahan in present-day New 
Julfa, Nakichivan—in order to contribute to the development of trade and commerce in 
Persia.  With the help of their ready-made connections abroad, these Armenian merchants 
were a significant factor in transforming Isfahan into a modern trading center by aiding in 
the development of a raw silk trade, the creation of new markets and products, and 
expanding the scope of Persian trade routes.31 Additionally, Armenians were often called 
on to represent both the Ottoman and Persian Empires due to their role as international 
merchants, allowing them greater cross-border mobility, economic and political 
influence, and the ability to represent the Armenian peoples abroad.  Some were even 
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Chapter 1:  Belonging and Otherness: Armenian Identity in Imperialist 
Russia and the Rise of a Nationalist Narrative 
The late eighteenth century witnessed the birth of nationalism in Europe and the 
beginning of an articulation of national awareness as a political idea.  Much like other 
regions of the world at this time, members of the Armenian community throughout the 
globe were attempting to understand themselves as a people and their place within the 
context of a larger international community.  Due to a long history of international trade 
and trans-border movement, the Armenian diaspora had already been established 
throughout Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East by this time.  But the introduction of the 
Russian Empire into the Caucasus in the seventeenth century, and their subsequent 
consolidation of power in the region by the first half of the nineteenth century, ultimately 
gave Armenian intellectual elites an opportunity to develop ideals of nationalism and 
national identity, which they attempted to trust upon the displaced and scattered 
Armenian communities by appealing to collective memories of a shared past steeped in 
both triumph and victimhood.  Acceptance of this narrative was not guaranteed, nor was 
it universal.  While some sectors of society did integrate it into their evolving identity, 
others were prone to resist a narrative that failed to acknowledge memories that failed to 
uphold its ‘message.’ 
The long-standing dispersal of the Armenian community had resulted in the lack 
of a coherent national identity.  But with the evolution of Europe-based nationalist 
sentiment around the world and its influence on Armenian merchants and intellectuals, a 
compulsion to unify this fractured society on more than religious grounds began to 
intensify and take shape by the mid-1800s. The formation of a unified ‘national’ identity 
based on the concept of a common Armenian past and culture was coupled with a desire 
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to free Armenians and historically Armenian lands from Muslim domination. However, 
this notion was not whole-heartedly embraced, nor was this desire new; it had long been 
fermenting within and evolving from various sectors of society from the grassroots level 
to the intellectual elite.33 The attempt to unify Diaspora identity could be considered the 
creation of an imagined community and the first phase in Karl W. Deutsch’s ethnic 
mobilization process—the creation of a unified people.34 This consciousness of 
nationhood and attempts at liberation amongst Armenians can be seen as early as the late 
seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries.35 Residing primarily in Eastern, Persian-
controlled Armenia and dependent upon foreign support, early Armenian elites aspired to 
create an Armenian space by selling a unified narrative abroad to the diaspora and a 
narrative based on religious persecution to foreign powers. However, this accusation of 
persecution fails to recognize the self-autonomy enjoyed under the millet system within 
the Ottoman Empire as well as a socioeconomic upward mobility experienced within the 
Persian Empire.36 In its determination to create a pro-independence collective, the 
narrative of an intelligent, noble, and ancient people suffering at the hands of their 
Islamic neighbors fails to acknowledge individual and social memories of prosperity and 
freedom enjoyed under both the Ottoman and Persian Empires.  
When Russian imperialist forces finally gained control of Eastern Armenia from 
Persia in the late eighteenth century, not all Armenians experienced a liberated life as 
promised under the new Christian rulers. Now subordinates of Russia, Armenians and 
                                                
33 Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (London, 
UK: Hurst and Company, 2006), 110. 
34 For more information on imagined communities, see: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York, NY: Verso, 1983).  For more information 
on nationalism and ethnic mobilization, see: Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. 
35 Panossian, The Armenians. 
36 The Ottoman millet system allowed for religious freedom and self-government under an Armenian 
leader for ethnic Armenian communities throughout the empire.  
 19 
other Caucasians in the new territory were subject to shifting Imperialist policies and 
interests in the region.  Continual conflicts and warring disrupted life and delayed the 
utopian-attempt of unifying Armenian communities under one national ethnic identity. 
Furthermore, Russification resulted in another division amongst these Eastern 
communities. While many Armenians assimilated enthusiastically into Russian society 
and culture, others resented the de-valuation of Armenian traditions and sought to fight 
against it. It is important to remember, however, that those Armenians who successfully 
adapted to Russian rule and were adopted into its society never forgot their ‘Armenian-
ness,’ a theme that would continue into the Soviet period.  An Armenian elite grew out of 
Saint Petersburg and, employing Western ideals of independence and self-determination, 
aided their compatriots’ nationalist movement in the Caucasus to create the first 
Armenian Republic in 1918.  
THE SEARCH FOR INDEPENDENCE  
In the late seventeenth century, influential Armenians actively sought support 
from Europe to free Eastern Armenia from Persian rule.  One of these individuals, Israel 
Ori, was a son of a local chieftain in the Zangezur region of the Persian Empire, southern 
region of modern-day Armenia.  Partly due to their geographic location in the mountains, 
this stronghold was ruled by Armenian principalities led by the last surviving members of 
a dying Armenian aristocracy who held roles as secular leaders in mountainous 
autonomous regions within the Persian Empire.  Travelling extensively throughout Italy, 
France, and Germany, Ori actively sought European military support to free eastern 
Armenia from Persian rule, but it soon became apparent that the successful liberation and 
creation of an independent Armenian state would depend on Russian involvement, not 
European.  To that end he met with Peter the Great in 1701, resulting in a Russian 
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delegation to Etchmiazdin to explore the possibility of a move against the Ottoman and 
Persian empires.37 Unfortunately for Ori, Russia was already engaged in war against 
Sweden, thus could not devote any resources to the Caucasus at that time. 38 He died 
before his goal of an Armenia free from Muslim rule would come to fruition, but his 
legacy lives on in Armenian memory as one so dedicated to freeing his people that he 
travelled the world with the help of a Diaspora already stationed throughout Europe.   
Another hero for the liberation cause was Davit Bek, who led a force against 
Persia in 1722 at the request of local Armenian chieftains.  By this time Russia was 
making advances into the Caucasus.  Worried by this expanding enemy and wanting to 
take advantage of a weak Persia, the Ottoman Empire began moving into Georgia and 
Persian-held Armenia.  Using guerilla tactics in the mountainous regions of the Caucasus, 
Davit Bek and his forces were able to successfully defend the autonomous areas 
controlled by Armenian chieftains and aid Russia in its bid for Caucasian territory. 
Unfortunately, Russian military aid never came to the Caucasus until much later and soon 
these local leaders were absorbed into Georgian and Russian aristocracies.  But Davit 
Bek and his resistance fighters were successful in maintaining the autonomy of these 
mountainous areas, which never fully integrated into or fell to Ottoman rule.   
Another liberation hero that lives on in the Armenian national memory is Joseph 
Emin.  His history is an excellent example of an early Diaspora Armenian who fought for 
Armenian liberation through diplomatic means. Active in the second-half of the 
eighteenth century, Emin recognized that in order to be successful in fighting against 
Ottoman and Persian rule, Armenians would need to learn modern western fighting 
techniques. Therefore he sought European and Russian help to create an Armenia that 
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would exist under Russian protection.  Spending a considerable amount of time in 
England and Prussia, he set his mind to learning modern warfare, building personal 
relationships, and garnering support from influential Europeans by appealing to their 
shared Christian background. When they proved unable to help him in his quest for 
Armenian freedom from Muslim rule, he travelled to Russia to gain support from the 
Tsar and even appealed to the King of Georgia to form a united front against those 
(Muslims) who had reduced Armenians and other Christians to ‘slavery.’39 His attempts 
to instill a sense of unity and need for freedom amongst the Armenian communities 
ultimately failed due in large part to the resistance he received from the Armenian 
church, which was loath to upset the balance of power in the region. Other communities, 
mostly those in rural areas, were complacent with their lives under Muslim rule and 
unconcerned with this resistance movement. Thus, the beginnings of competing 
narratives of the church versus a nationalistic liberation movement can be seen within the 
Armenian community. 
While attempts to inculcate a unified collective identity based upon ideals of an 
autonomous Armenian nation free from Muslim rule failed in the eighteenth century, they 
did lay the groundwork for later successful endeavors of the same kind.  However, these 
‘rebellions’ all focused on the need for outside (European or Russian) intervention, a 
need that is still in evidence today. So while various individuals did demonstrate a sense 
of agency in their attempts to break away from imperialist rule, it could be claimed that 
this deep-seated belief in the necessity of foreign intervention for the survival of the 
Armenian people has created a sense of dependency in the Armenian psyche, a memory 
that is not consciously held on to but exists in various narratives nonetheless.  A recurring 
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theme in small-nation mentalities, a counter-narrative of dependency and victimhood 
arises by invoking the power of the Russian empire to maintain the security of its borders.   
One memory that is often silenced by the national narrative is one of relative 
peace and prosperity enjoyed under the ‘Muslim yoke’ within the millet system.  Political 
and economic stability in the Ottoman Empire by the late sixteenth century led to the 
emergence of a new middle-class as well the laying of groundwork for the Armenian 
amira class (also known as business barons) and guilds of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  These Armenians in the Lake Van area became especially economically and 
culturally vibrant according to the Armenian historian Payaslian.40 The Armenian 
communities here prospered during these years, which led Armenian leaders to revive a 
sense of nationhood and instill ideals of an Armenian people liberated from Muslim rule.  
However, this apparent prosperity as international merchants and business leaders often 
resulted in a stratification of Armenian and Turkish society along economic lines and 
contributing to cultural isolation. Thus, the roots of the nationalistic drive for Armenian 
independence began long before the emergence of the Dashnak party—an ultra-
nationalist group that arose at the end of the nineteenth century.   
During the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Armenians were very active in business 
and trade.  However, by the late nineteenth century the Empire began to suffer political 
instability, economic downturns, and increasing ethnic tensions throughout its vast 
territories.  This helped to contribute to the emigration of a large portion of the Armenian 
population into Europe, America, and the Middle East. Moreover, the advance of the 
Russian Empire south into the Caucasus resulted in Russian dominion over Armenians 
living in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Eastern Armenia.  The Russo-Persian Wars of 1804 to 
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1813 and 1826 to 1828, and their treaties of Golestan (1813) and Torkmanchai (1828), 
led to Russia absorbing the territories of Karabagh, Zangezur, Yerevan, and 
Nakhichevan. Another conflict, the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1806 to 1812 (Treaty of 
Bucharest 1812) and 1828-1829 (Treaty of Adrianople 1829) added the territories of 
Akhalkalak and Akhaltskha to Russia. The Crimean War of 1853 to 1856 did not result in 
Russia gaining any new territories, but it occurred on historically Armenian lands and 
often involved Armenians in varying roles. Lastly, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 to 
1878 and the 1878 Treaty of Berlin resulted in Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi falling under 
Russian rule. 
While Russian incursion into the Caucasus occurred over a long period of time, 
by 1828 the Arax River officially became dividing line between Russia and Persia.41 Both 
Peter the Great and Catherine the Great attempted to wrest control of eastern Armenia 
from Persia.  However, it was not until 1828 that the Russian Empire was successful in its 
attempts to push back the Persian Empire. It seems, though, that Armenians generally 
welcomed Russian occupation.  While many were hesitant to blatantly revolt against their 
Islamic rulers, once Russian presence was established in the region, and it did not seem 
as if the Slavs would abandon them, Armenians tended to lend both moral and military 
support to their Christian brothers.42 
THE CREATION OF A NARRATIVE OF VICTIMHOOD 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian Empire’s expansion into the Caucasus 
was largely complete. It successfully wrested control of Persian Armenia from the 
Persian Empire and established the Yerevan and Kars provinces [see figure 2].  Here, 
                                                
41 Treaty of Turkmanchai 
42 For more information, see George A. Bournoutian, trans., Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia, 
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Russia was able to launch attacks against the Ottoman Empire with the help of local 
guerilla fighters, among who many Armenians were included.  For these local 
Armenians, as well as for many within the Ottoman Empire, Russia represented a 
liberating force that could be used to free the Armenian people from Ottoman rule and 
reestablish their former glory as an independent nation.  However, establishing an 
autonomous ethnic nation would not be so easy, even with external aid.   
Figure 2: Armenian Territories in the late 18th to late 19th centuries 
Ottoman Christians and Muslims often interacted closely with one another 
throughout the history of the empire.  While violence between these groups did occur, 
they generally coexisted. The Caucasus’s long history of tribal-centric traditions and 
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intragroup conflict had often led to feuds, but they were not ethnic or religious-based 
until much later in the nineteenth century when ideals of nationalism based on religion 
and ethnicity were taking root in the region.  When conflict did erupt prior to this change, 
socioeconomic divisions typically divided wealthier Christians from their poorer Islamic 
neighbors. Such divisions were ripe for their use by the Ottoman government to punish 
perceived disloyalty and, consequently, a series of Muslim pogroms against Armenians 
and other Christians in the mid 1880s commenced.43 Between 1892 and 1915, conflict 
between Armenians and Turks intensified. A nationalistic movement was growing in 
large Armenian communities within the declining Empire, and there were many instances 
of Armenians helping Russia in her conflicts against the Ottoman Empire in the multiple 
Russo-Turkish wars, especially those in the later part of the nineteenth century.  
However, much of this Armenian support came from those closer to the conflict zones, 
such as along the Russian-Turkish Armenian border around Yerevan.  Armenian guerilla 
fighters here played a large part in Russian victory against the Ottomans in the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-1878. Consequently, Russia’s use of local power increased 
suspicion of all Armenians throughout the Ottoman’s declining empire.  Even those in 
Istanbul, far removed from the fighting, became perceived as untrustworthy.  This 
ultimately led to increased ethnic tensions exacerbated by government pogroms aimed 
against Armenians in an attempt to curtail their rebelliousness and strengthen Ottoman 
sovereignty. 
Armenian involvement in these skirmishes was varied.  One one hand, many 
Armenians did not dramatically oppose Ottoman or Persian rule in the early nineteenth 
century.  Having lived for centuries under foreign rule, Armenian communities had 
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learned to live within the strictures of the dominating society.  For those living within the 
Ottoman Empire, Armenians enjoyed a level of autonomy within their isolated 
communities in Eastern Anatolia due to the millet system.  Even those residing in 
Istanbul were able to rule their communities and enjoy a certain amount of religious 
freedom.  Since many living in the capital enjoyed a higher standard of living through 
their roles as traders, merchants, and various other white-collar professions, an Armenian 
intellectual society developed in Turkey with the aid of a long tradition of cross-cultural 
communication and movement between historic Armenia and the Diaspora community 
throughout the globe.  However, it was not until the late nineteenth century when 
Armenians began to unite against Ottoman rule.   
One accusation of the Ottoman Empire for the targeting of Armenians was that 
they were traitors to the Empire during the Crimean and Russo-Turkish wars.  While it is 
true that some Armenians, mainly those in the mountainous regions of the Caucasus, 
aided the Russian military and served as guerilla fighters against Ottoman forces, there is 
no evidence proving that all Armenians felt this way.  There is evidence showing a 
growing nationalist movement among Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul, the members of 
which were ultimately the targets of the pogroms (along with other Christians) committed 
by the Young Turks around the turn of the twentieth century in Turkey.  
 In a campaign during World War I in1915, Ottoman troops attempted to infiltrate 
the Russian held South Caucasus but were thwarted in large part due to small bands of 
local guerrilla fighters mobilized by the Russian army.44 From such victories against the 
Ottomans, it became apparent to the Russian military that using locals who knew how to 
fight in the topography of eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus mountains would be more 
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effective than using Russian soldiers unfamiliar with the mountainous terrain. Many 
Armenians, particularly those in the Russian-held province of Yerevan, were quickly 
recruited for further such use by appealing to the emerging desire for Armenian 
independence and nationhood. Due to the most recent wave of nationalism sweeping 
Armenian communities both abroad and in Anatolia, support for these ‘freedom fighters’ 
and the country ‘aiding’ them—Russia—was widespread. However, the ongoing support 
of local guerrillas exacerbated tensions between Muslim and Armenian populations and 
led to a very real belief of possible Armenian insurrection.  Armenian villagers were seen 
as dangerous tools in the hands of the Russian enemy, while Armenian intellectuals in 
large urban centers like Istanbul were suspected of fomenting rebellion.  This was the 
impetus for their resettlement and targeting by the Ottomans, a policy which soon 
escalated to an all-out war against its own people.   
 Between 1914 and 1923, the Ottoman policy of relocating and resettling suspect 
elements of the population—primarily Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian Christians—
resulted in large-scale violence and systematic ethnic cleansing of Christians, the 
prosecution of minority leaders, and the forced deportation under deplorable conditions 
of entire communities.  However, this was not a consequence of a single explicit order or 
an ancient religious quarrel between Muslims and Christians. Rather, it was a 
consequence of communal fear, ethnic reprisals, government paranoia, and 
experimentation with using targeted killing as a tool of modern statecraft.45 And while 
popular Armenian memory has come to remember this genocide as a single event—the 
incarceration and murder of Armenian community leaders in Constantinople on April 24, 
1915—in reality, it more closely resembled an ebb and flow of violence over a period of 
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time that swept across eastern Anatolia, pushing refugees into Yerevan and modern-day 
Syria and Iraq.   
 An estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed or died under the 
harsh conditions of deportation, while other Christians continued to perish well after the 
1918 armistice. Those who survived the Genocide fled to Russian-controlled areas of the 
Caucasus, Europe, America, and the Middle East.  A very small number remained in 
Turkey, mainly in large urban centers like Istanbul.  However, many of those who stayed 
had previously converted to Islam and underwent “Turkification” and “Kurdification” 
programs.  The majority of survivors fled to Northern Syria and other areas of the Middle 
East.  Some temporarily returned to their homelands during the French Mandate, during 
which France controlled Southeastern Turkey and all of Cilicia under the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, which was enacted in 1916.46  But a Turkish war of independence between 
1919 and 1923 after the Ottoman dissolution resulted in another bout of deportation and 
targeting of Armenians when nationalist Turkish groups rebelled against the Allies who 
had controlled the former Ottoman lands at the end of the First World War.  Thus by the 
end of the 1920’s, only a handful of scattered Armenians remained in Turkey. Though an 
Armenian millet still exists within Turkey today, as well as a patriarchate in Istanbul, it 
does not enjoy the same powers as it once did under the Ottoman Empire.  It now 
resembles more of an ethnic community in which Armenians are able to practice their 
own religion and have their own cultural, social, and educational institutions as well as 
their own distinct media and newspapers rather than a self-governing community.  
The various instances of what Armenian memory deems ethnic cleansing by the 
Ottoman government helped to transform Eastern Anatolia into a more homogenous 
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region while shaping Turkey into a national state rather than a multi-ethnic religious 
empire.  And whereas before the genocide it was possible to be both an Armenian and an 
Ottoman, now it was impossible to be both an Armenian and a Turk.47 This event became 
a fundamental component of the modern history and identity of Armenians by changing 
the demographic structure of the southern provinces.  The Genocide of the Armenians 
and their persecution at the hands of the Turks has since dominated the Armenian 
national narrative, seeping into individual consciousness as the paramount event in the 
history of the Armenian people.  Much like the Holocaust for the Jewish people, the 
trauma of the early twentieth century has come to dominate much of Armenian life and 
has resulted in a forgetting of other, less-traumatic experiences of the past, especially for 
those who comprise the modern-day Western Diaspora in Europe, the Middle East, and 
the Americas.  Interestingly, the memories and identity of those who remained in 
Armenian territory and comprise the Eastern Diaspora in Russia and Iran are less likely to 
be over-shadowed by the Genocide. While it remains an important component of the 
national narrative of Armenia and the diaspora in Russia, these groups are more likely to 
recall other instances of oppression and trauma, especially in regards to Azerbaijan. 
In what is today Azerbaijan, tensions between Armenians and Azeris were fraught 
at the turn of the century, much like today.  Baku, modern-day Azerbaijan’s capital and 
largest city, consisted of roughly 12% ethnic Armenians in the 1897 census, compared to 
about 35% Azeri Muslims and 25% Russians.  When peasant insurrections and labor 
unrest erupted here at the beginning of the twentieth century, social tensions ignited as 
labor and communal issues merged.  Muslim rioters targeted Armenian communities and 
burned down the properties of Armenian shopkeepers.48  This was partially due to a 
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mutual fear that the Armenians were planning to eliminate Muslims and that Muslims 
were repeating the anti-Armenian pogroms of the Ottomans.  And while this city had 
long enjoyed a sense of diversity, religiously grouped citizens typically occupied their 
own areas where they lived separate lives.  Unrest reached a tipping point in August of 
1905 when local Azeri destroyed entire Armenian areas, spurring these people to flee to 
Yerevan or abroad.  It is important to note that most Armenians consider the people of 
Azerbaijan to be Turks.  So when conflict erupts between the two people, its serves as a 
reminder of a history of trauma suffered under the Ottomans.  Thus, Armenian rejection 
of Azerbaijan could be considered a rejection of a past that continually places Armenians 
in the vulnerable role of victim.  
ETHNICITY IN THE EMPIRE 
The concept of ethnicity and otherness in the Russian Empire was a significant 
factor in the formation of pre-Soviet Armenian Identity.  The perception of Armenians 
throughout the empire and their treatment affected how they perceived themselves 
individually as Armenians and collectively as a minority group from the Caucasus.  At 
the same time, notions of Russia and the Russians influenced the development of 
Armenian ethnic consciousness. Russian policy regarding Armenians and other ethnic 
groups within the Empire altered widely from administration to administration and 
influenced the degree with which the rest of the Empire perceived these groups. For 
Armenians, these shifts in attitudes depended largely on Russia’s geopolitical interests in 
the Caucasus region, internal politics of the Empire, and changes within the Armenian 
community.  Three general categorizations of Armenians existed; they were represented 
as either Christian brothers, as businessmen, or as conspirators.   
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The first two images held relatively positive connotations.  Their shared Christian 
culture spoke to Russia’s messianic drive to free its lands of Muslim influence and 
established a bond based on religion that still exists today.  Russians also thought that 
Armenians “without any doubt take first place among the inhabitants of the 
Transcaucasus for their ability, industriousness and effort to educate themselves” and 
were regarded as “the most industrious workers of the East.”49 They were also considered 
“peaceable, gentle, cautious, calculating, diligent, tied to their families, industrious, 
delicate, quiet, obedient, trying to act in compliance with the law…”50 Furthermore, their 
loyalty was at one point seen as “devoted to the Russian government,” Armenians “could 
not betray us.”51 
As businessmen, Armenians were seen as useful for advancing Russia’s success 
on the quickly developing economic world stage. However, their role in business and 
trade gave rise to labels such as “Jews of the Caucasus,” which indicates a level of 
contempt among Russians towards this ethnic group. As discussed earlier, Armenians 
have often played the role of merchants or made up the middle class in many countries 
outside of their homeland, especially in Georgia.  Here, Armenians stood out in the 
economic and administrative life of the capital city of Tiflis, modern-day Tbilisi.  At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Armenians made up about 75% of the city’s 
population.  This percentage dropped down to little more than 33% by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, but they remained the single largest cultural group and were largely 
responsible for financing construction and municipal administration within Tiflis.52 This, 
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however, contributed to persecution and discrimination against the Armenians.  Much 
like Jewish populations in Russia and elsewhere, they were often seen as greedy 
merchants who took advantage of the common folk. Oliver Wardrop, the first British 
high commissioner in the Caucasus, said of the Armenians in Tiflis in the 1880s: “Only 
those who have lived the life of the people in Trans-Caucasia know what a terrible curse 
the money-lending community are.  A local proverb says, ‘A Greek will cheat three Jews, 
but an Armenian will cheat three Greeks,’ and the Georgian, straightforward, honest 
fellow, is but too often cruelly swindled by the artful children of the Haïk.”53 This view 
was picked up by many visitors to Tiflis from intellectuals and administrators jealous of 
the influence Armenians wielded in its financial and commercial sectors.  This prejudice 
is further evident in an exhibit of the new Russian-built Caucasus Museum in 1867 that 
featured the natural and cultural diversity of the city.  While some exhibits featured flora 
and fauna of the region, others “were filled with mannequins dressed in ethnic costumes 
and placed against painted scenes of appropriate habitats.”  Here Armenians were 
featured along with Jews, stereotyped as “engaged in some transaction.”54 This 
unflattering view led to a feeling of ‘otherness’ and contributed to a desire to feel 
exceptional in their uniqueness amongst other Caucasians, a theme evident in their 
developing national narrative of the time.  
Likewise, the image of the conspirator reflected an opposition to the rise of 
Armenian nationalism and rebellion. For those diaspora communities living abroad in 
Europe and Russia, an emerging Armenian intelligentsia became increasing exposed to 
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various intellectual movements.55 The more radical individuals began to challenge 
traditional institutions like the Church while conservatives upheld traditions and the 
notion of strengthening communities by revitalizing long-standing culture.  Thus, it could 
be argued that a struggle between modernity and tradition—urban and rural, secular and 
religious—was at the root of ongoing divisions.  However, both groups had the same 
ultimate objective: to revive Armenian national identity across diaspora communities.  
One of the most important vehicles for establishing a unique national Armenian identity 
was through religious affiliation.  Even under Muslim rule, the Armenian Apostolic 
Church remained an important vehicle for retaining and promoting a sense of cultural 
identity among Armenian farmers and traders.56 However, the church’s ancient seat at 
Echmiadzin had long competed with both cultural and political sources of authority.  The 
problem of who speaks for the Armenians—those within Armenia or the diaspora 
communities—is still a point of contention.57 The perceived turn of the Armenian elite 
towards rebellion shifted Russian attitudes towards Armenians as a whole.  They became 
to be thought of as a dangerous “nation of revolutionaries and conspirators…any 
Armenian in the Caucasus is regarded as a revolutionary just for being Armenian.”58 
Furthermore, many Armenians were generally resistant to the Russification process that 
the empire had enacted in the Caucasus since the late 1800’s, and Russian attitude 
towards their ‘little brothers’ in the Caucasus was generally condescending.  
In the Ottoman Empire, Armenians were able to acquire a certain level of status, 
position, and wealth. However, they were never able to rise above second-class 
citizenship since they were always considered fundamentally different from the dominant 
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Muslim society.59 The categories used by the first Russian Imperial Census of the 
Caucasus, conducted in 1897, illustrate the general trend at the time for defining one’s 
identity: social category, religion, and language.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
category of ethnicity or nationality did not yet have the all-powerful sense that it would 
acquire under the Soviets.60 Thus, identity at this time was based primarily on religious 
and linguistic characteristics. According to Panossian, “Russian policy was not consistent 
and oscillated between repressive measures to Russify the population and a more tolerant 
attitude of giving the Armenians…some autonomy over cultural, educational and 
religious institutions.”61 In the 1820’s General Yermolov, also referred to as the ‘owner 
of the Caucasus,’ was charged with insuring Russian domination of the Caucasus by 
introducing Russian military policies that earned him a reputation for brutality.62 Later, in 
1836, Russia enacted polozhenie, which reduced the Armenian Church’s political powers 
and ensured that the Catholicos of Etchmiazdin had to be elected by religious and non-
religious dignitaries, an election in which the Tsar would ultimately decide the victor.  
However, the Church was still allowed to open schools and establish newspapers.63 
Under Alexander III in the late 1800s, Armenians and other ethnic minorities endured a 
strict Russification process.  Beginning in 1885, all Armenian schools were closed and 
replaced with Russian schools, which incited a radicalized Armenian intelligentsia to 
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resist and establish secret schools.64 The schools were reopened a year later, but the 
damage had already been done.   
Shifting Imperial policies regarding Armenians ultimately helped to create a sense 
otherness and alienation while attempting to create a sense of belonging. After all, the 
goal of assimilation policies was to incorporate minority groups into the Russian Empire.  
However, their inconsistency insured that while these groups were part of the Empire, 
they were held on the fringes of Russian society and were able to retain their traditions 
and drive for nationhood much like under the Ottoman Empire. However increasingly 
concerned with their security in the region, Armenians ultimately continued to consider 
Russia their protector, a role Russia would pick up and use when it suited its interests.  
Furthermore, the bond with Russia tended to grow stronger as relations with their Muslim 
neighbors worsened.  While sharing a cultural background of Christianity helped build 
and strengthen ties between Russia and Armenia, they were not the only ones persecuted 
on the basis of religion.  As a result of ongoing persecution by both the Ottomans and 
Persians, many Armenians chose to flee to Russian-protected territories, thus 
repopulating Eastern Armenia and causing regions like Yerevan to once again have an 
Armenian majority.  This influx of Christian Armenians also resulted in massive 
emigration of Muslim populations who had inhabited these areas since the rule of the 
Persian Empire.  This shifting of ethnic and religious populations led to a concentration 
of Armenians within Russian-held Armenia and ultimately allowed for the unification 
and consolidation of a national Armenian identity within the future nation-state. 
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ROLES AND FUNCTIONS  
In the nineteenth Century the percentage of Armenians in relation to Muslims in 
Russian-held Armenia had begun to increase due to immigration of Muslims to Ottoman 
lands.  These Islamic migrants began to expel Armenians from their ancient homeland in 
Eastern Anatolia and forced them to migrate to areas around Yerevan.  It was not until 
the early 1830s that Armenians formed a majority of the population there.  According to 
an 1897 census, Armenians constituted 53% of the Yerevan district and Muslims about 
42%, while the city of Yerevan itself retained a majority Muslim population until the 
First World War and the Genocide, which resulted in Armenians flooding across the 
border into Russian-occupied Armenia and pushing out Muslims into mainly Azerbaijan 
and Iran.65  Consequently, Russian Armenia became a safe haven for Armenians while its 
centuries-old Muslim population became increasingly unwelcome.  As of the most recent 
census, modern-day Armenia is now composed of 97.9% ethnic Armenians, with 98.7% 
identifying themselves as Christian.66 This helps to illustrate the drastic consequences the 
Ottoman and Turkish cleansing pogroms had on not only the Armenians, but also the 
entire Muslim population of the Anatolian and Southern Caucasus region. Furthermore, it 
concentrated Armenian communities in the Caucasus, which aided in their movement 
throughout the Russian Empire in various roles and functions in some cases similar to 
those they held under both the Ottoman and Persian empires. 
 Similar to their roles within Islamic society of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, 
one of the most important functions that Armenians held in the Russian Empire was as 
merchants.  Ivan Lazarevich Lazarov, christened Hovannes Lazarian, was born to the 
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Armenian community in Persian New Julfa in 1735.  About thirty years later after 
establishing himself within the business community, he moved to Saint Petersburg to 
become one of the richest men in Catherine the Great’s Empire.  His support of Armenian 
immigration through the establishment of educational and charitable organizations had an 
enormous impact on the growth of the early Armenian diaspora in Russia.  While he 
successfully integrated into Russian society as a well-known jeweler, he never lost his 
Armenian memories or his Armenian identity, instead merging them with new ones as a 
subject of the Russian Empire.  Lazarov is an example of the role Armenians played in 
trade and business within the empire, rising in stature at Catherine the Great’s court and 
establishing himself in the mythology of Armenian exceptionalism. 
In addition to functioning as business and trading elites, some Armenians 
assimilated into the Russian aristocracy and military. Valerian Madatov is an example of 
the dying class of the Armenian nobility that immigrated to Georgia and Russia, where 
they were often absorbed into the to the existing upper classes of society and political 
power.  He was born Rostom Madatyan, in what is today Nagorno-Karabakh, to a minor 
Armenian noble family.  There, he served as melik before migrating to Russia in order to 
request aid from Catherine the Great in freeing Armenians from Persian rule. Madatov 
gained experience commanding and fighting in Russia’s military during the Russo-
Turkish war of 1801-1812, against Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, the Russo-
Persian War of 1826-1828, the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829, and generally serving 
in the Caucasus as commander-in-chief of several former Persian khanates during his 
lifetime.  Another notable figure from this class of Russian-Armenians is Mikhail Loris-
Melikov.  Born to a noble Armenian family who once owned the Lori province of 
modern-day Armenia, he is another example of an Armenian aristocrat who assimilated 
into the Russian Empire’s military and nobility.  Interestingly, he resigned from Minister 
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of the Interior, a position he held under Tsar Alexander II, when the new Tsar Alexander 
III began reversing the reforms of his father. 
Many Armenian immigrants also integrated into the artistic and intellectual circles 
of the Empire.  Ivan Konstantinovich Aivazovsky was born Hovannes Aivazian to an 
Armenian family in current-day Crimea in 1817.  He is considered one of Russia’s great 
romantic painters and hailed for his depictions of seascapes. His personal history 
effortlessly exemplifies the diaspora Armenian of the nineteenth century. His family 
emigrated from Ottoman Armenia in the eighteenth century. His father, an Armenian 
merchant from Polish Galicia, settled in the Crimean port of Feodosia where Ivan was 
born, thus offering the future painter an opportunity to fall in love with the sea.  Many 
Armenian themes can be seen in his early paintings, thus suggesting an internalization of 
Armenian memories and history that helped form his own Identity as an Armenian-
Russian. After finally visiting Russian-held Armenia around the age of fifty, Ivan 
Aivazovsky became the first Armenian to paint Mount Ararat, a theme he would revisit 
throughout the rest of his life.  Along with Mount Ararat and the story of Noah, he 
painted scenes from Armenia’s ancient past as well as portraits of prominent Armenians 
including Mikhail Loris-Melikov.  His paintings have been sold in recent years for 
millions of dollars and continue to be held in esteem. Thus, Ivan Aivazovsky was both 
influenced by collective Armenian memories of an ancient past and helped to reinforce 
and propagate those memories by creating cites of memory with his artwork to which the 
Armenian narrative can refer. 
Lastly, Armenians created for themselves roles within the literary and media 
sectors of the Russian Empire that catered to the Armenian-speaking sections of Tsarist 
society.  Under Tsarist rule influential Armenian elites, particularly in Saint Petersburg, 
were able to establish their own newspapers.  This press was directly responsible for 
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formulating, articulating, and popularizing the language, culture, and national identity of 
Eastern Armenia within Russia and throughout the Caucasus.67  A main concern for 
nineteenth century Eastern Armenian literature was to explain the reasons for the 
worldwide diaspora, discourage further fragmentation, and transform a diverse 
understanding of ethnic identity into a standardized nationality.68 They were primarily 
concerned with uniting a dispersed people and constructing a formal sense of national 
identity and nationality. Russian Imperialism gave scattered Armenian communities the 
opportunity to form a basis for a modern nationalizing movement. Diaspora intellectuals 
stopped perceiving themselves as a disenfranchised, fractured, stateless religious 
community and began to think in terms of a unified nation based on historic Armenia.69  
This fixated dispersion and migration as a unique collective narrative.  
CONCLUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST ARMENIAN NATION-STATE 
The arrival of the ‘Armenian Question’ at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 
officially politicized within European diplomacy the debate for a separate Armenian 
nation-state.  In order to retain its legitimacy over the region, Russia incorporated this 
ideal into its foreign policy agenda with the urging of a growing number of Armenian 
intellectuals in St. Petersburg.  However for the Tsarist Empire, this Armenian nation-
state could only exist as a subject of Russian rule to the consternation of those who 
presented at the Congress.  Officially, Russia was to intercede in order to protect 
Christians from Muslim subjugation.  This narrative of Christian brotherhood appears 
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again and again in Armenian-Russian interactions, often used as a means for Armenia to 
request aid from Russia or for Russia to interfere in Armenian affairs.  The Armenian 
intellectual and clerical elite generally welcomed Russian expansion into their territories, 
seeing them as cultural and religious liberators.  While the church was generally reluctant 
to overtly rebel against their Islamic overlords for fear of vicious reprisals, they embraced 
their Russian brothers in Christ when it was evident that Persian influence in the eastern 
region was at an end.  
Rather than simply playing the role of victim to the interests of Persian, Ottoman, 
and Russian Empires, Armenians actively sought to establish for themselves a national 
identity, a sense of belonging, and a unified history that would lend itself to an 
independent state run by and for their own people. Their standing in Russian society as 
tradesman, businessmen, artists, military leaders, and intellectual elites helped to 
establish and engender a sense of belonging and connection with Russia at the same time 
it fermented a drive towards nationhood.  According to Aram Arkun, “Tsarist oppressions 
and Ottoman massacres at the end of the nineteenth century gave way to a series of 
revolutionary movements, and Armenians gained hope for the achievement of political 
liberty and security within radically transformed imperial societies.”70 This led to an 
increased awareness of commonality among various Armenian groups as well as 
alienation from imperialist rulers.  Armenian communities in Russian-held territory 
reconciled their newly formed national identity within an often-hostile Empire by 
upholding their ‘otherness,’ uniqueness, and expectionalism as a unified Christian 
collective persecuted by their Islamic neighbors. However, this narrative often stresses 
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memories of Genocide at the expense of alternative memories of trauma, such as the 
1905 Armenian-Tatar war as well as counter-memories of prosperity and peace.  
In 1918, Azerbaijan declared independence and established the Azerbaijan 
Democratic Republic on May 28th, just two days after Georgia’s own declaration.  
Armenia, too, founded its republic on the same day as Azerbaijan and its borders were 
likewise based on preexisting imperial boundaries.  The Yerevan and Kars districts 
combined to create this new independent Armenian state. Armenian intellectuals and 
professionals from across Russia and the West flooded into the city and organized a 
provisional parliament led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation—also know as the 
Dashnaks.  By June of 1919, this group dominated the new parliament and essentially 
created a one-party state controlling key personnel appointments.  This further alienated 
the local Muslim population and gave Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Bolsheviks fuel to 
influence the country through this growingly dissatisfied minority.71 In May of 1920, 
Bolshevik agents fomented an uprising that quickly spread across the entire republic.  
Rebels were joined by discontented units of the Armenian army as well as by leaders of 
some Muslim areas.  The ruling Dashnak party quickly squashed this rebellion, and then 
proceeded to empty Muslim villages and expel its citizens to Turkey or Azerbaijan while 
replacing them with Armenian settlers.  Both Turkey and Russia exploited this chaos and 
began moving into the new Republic, Turkey from the West and Russia from the East via 
Azerbaijan.  Faced with a choice between Turkey and Russia, Yerevan submitted to the 
Bolsheviks and officially came under Russian power in December of 1920, thus 
suppressing the notion of a greater Armenia. At this time there still existed a significant 
population of Muslims, which were represented in the Parliament.  However, by 1926, 
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the Armenian population would rise to 84.6%, pushing out other groups and establishing 
a homogenized base of society towards which to aim statist narratives. 72 
 
  
                                                
72 The Demographic Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia).  
 43 
Chapter 2:  Remembering Communism: The Impact of the Soviet 
Experience on Identity Formation  
In a picturesque corner of Armenia in 1895, the small village of Sanain was 
situated among ploughed fields, forest-covered mountains, and pastures of abundant 
wildflowers.73 Out of this serene setting would rise one of the most influential Armenians 
for not only the Soviet Union, but also for a people struggling to survive and thrive in a 
rapidly changing world.  As an elite member of the Soviet regime in Moscow who served 
from Lenin to Brezhnev without incident, Anastas Mikoyan became embedded in an 
Armenian national myth as a figure of Armenian triumph and exceptionalism, ideals 
greatly needed to combat a collective identity often steeped in trauma and victimhood.  “I 
have only a few memories of my early childhood, and these are fragmentary…. I clearly 
recall my native village of Sanain, situated in one of the picturesque corners of 
Armenia…there rose forest-covered mountains, and beyond the mountains alpine 
pastures abounding in wildflowers extended as far as the eye could see….During my 
childhood years Sanain was one of the many backward villages on the outlying borders of 
Tsarist Russia. Its people were downtrodden, lawless, and uneducated.”74 For Mikoyan 
and other Soviet Armenian contemporaries, Armenia represented a point of nostalgic 
remembrance that inhabited the idyllic and the backward, a sentimental past in need of a 
communist future.  This narrative would come to dominate life in Soviet Armenia, but 
would ultimately fail to eradicate traditional Armenian culture and what it meant to be 
Armenian devoid of communist influence. Differing levels of participation in the Soviet 
experiment are evident throughout the life of the Armenian Soviet Republic. Incidents of 
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dissent and nationalist expression among the citizenry, as well as instances of negotiation 
and concession by the communist party, led to a society still firmly entrenched in its 
ethnic identity.  In order to examine individual, social, and collective memory of the 
Soviet experience and its impact on this identity, it is necessary to examine memories of 
lived experiences and levels of participation, negotiation, and dissent; the intersections 
and roles of statist narratives; and the tools those narratives used to imbed themselves in 
both individual and collective Armenian identity. 
PARTICIPATION AND DISSENT 
Participation in the Soviet system was seldom black or white, but rather occupied 
an in-between grey space of mutual negotiation and compromise amongst all echelons of 
society.  This was especially true for the citizens of the Soviet Socialist Republic of 
Armenia.  As the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
a new Young Turk administration came to power in Anatolia, and soon a systematic 
targeting of Christians followed. This attack was largely in response to a suspected 
alliance with Russian and Western forces during World War I. As the largest Christian 
population, Armenians suffered a devastating loss to their communities living under 
Young Turk rule.  At the same time, Russia was experiencing its own turmoil in the form 
of internal rebellions against Tsarist policies. The ousting of Tsar Nicolas II and 
subsequent Bolshevik Revolution allowed the Russian-controlled Armenian territory east 
of Turkey to declare independence in 1918. During the Republic of Armenia’s first 
attempt at independent rule from 1918 to 1920, politicians in Yerevan could not agree on 
how to successfully combat the issues threatening the new country.  The aftermath of the 
First World War and the Ottoman pogroms against Armenians resulted in a stream of 
refugees flooding into the province of Yerevan.  In addition to a growing refugee 
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problem, recent years of warfare and migration had resulted in social turmoil, an 
increasingly disgruntled Muslim minority, and ethnic and political violence from hostile 
Bolshevik, Azerbaijani, and Georgian interests.  “Armed bans roamed the countryside, 
establishing their own rule at gunpoint.  Internal order was hampered by the activities of 
large numbers of demobilized soldiers and simple thugs who had learned to subscribe 
outside the bounds of legality.”75 As a result, the new republic was divided over how to 
deal with the lawlessness and a growing opposition of Muslims who had long resided in 
the area prior to Armenians moving in from Eastern Anatolia.  Both Turkey and the new 
communist power in Russia saw this as an opportunity to wrest control away from the 
seemingly inept Armenian state and began to encroach upon the republic’s territory, 
Turkey from the west and Russia from the east via Azerbaijan.  For the majority of 
Armenians, Turkey posed the greatest threat to Armenian nationalism and the survival of 
the Armenian people due to the atrocities suffered under the Ottoman Empire.  Thus, a 
large majority felt that joining the Russian Soviets would allow for the continuation of 
Armenia even under the flag of communism.  Faced with a choice between Turkey and 
Russia, leaders of the Republic in Yerevan decided to back the lesser of two evils and 
officially joined the Soviet Union in December of 1920. But was this new Soviet 
administrative unit the legitimate successor of the national movement of 1918, or a cheap 
perversion of the national ideal?  Where did legitimacy lie?  Was it on the ground in 
Yerevan or with the ultra-nationalists who continued to fight for Armenian statehood?  
These questions were debated in the dueling narratives of the communist state and the 
oppositional nationalists, the memories they evoked, their level of participation and 
dissent, and their answers to what it meant to be Armenian.  
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When Armenia was proclaimed an independent socialist republic on December 2, 
1920, Armenian society was in a state of ‘demodernization’ due to war, genocide, 
revolution, and strife since 1914.76 In order to save the many Armenian refugees from 
starvation and to stabilize economic and political sectors, socialist Armenians and 
intellectual nationalists threw support behind the Soviet Union and communist ideology 
in hopes it would modernize the people and the nation, which in turn would aid in the 
fruition of nationalist goals for a unified Armenian people.  In the 1920s the nationalist 
Dashnak party still held the majority of support in the small republic while a relatively 
strong but growing number of intelligentsia supported the communists.  Soviet 
Armenians like Anastas Mikoyan, future apparatchik, and Stepan Shaumian, early 
Bolshevik, made names for themselves in Azerbaijan and Russia by helping to ‘build 
communism.’ This group is the most obvious source for willing participation in the 
Soviet system.  They also show significant agency in the construction and dissemination 
of Soviet culture. 
As the fate of socialism in Russia was being determined by a struggle for power 
amongst the socialist revolutionaries who successfully ousted Tsar Nicolas II in 1917, so 
too was the fate of the Caucasus being determined by loyal Armenian soviets.  The 
changing of power in Russia after the revolution resulted in unstable Russian control over 
the Caucasus.  This, in addition to the deteriorating power of the Ottoman Empire at the 
same time, left the region vulnerable to foreign interference.  Not only were Russia and 
Turkey involved in the region, but Britain also threw its hat into the ring for Caucasian 
resources, the most lucrative being oil, when this opportunity presented itself. Thus in 
order to maintain control, Lenin sent a leader of the communist movement—Stepan 
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Shaumian—to impose Soviet rule in Baku.77 Dubbed the ‘Caucasian Lenin,’ Shaumian 
became chairman of this Baku commune, which also included Mikoyan and other local 
agitators for the Bolshevik cause who would become known as the twenty-six Baku 
commissars.78  Unfortunately for this group, anti-Bolshevik Socialist Revolutionaries in 
Russia executed everyone except Mikoyan in 1918 while fleeing an invading force of 
Turks entering Baku. Thus, these figures, especially Shaumian, became matrys for the 
Soviet cause and featured heavily in the communist statist narrative.  However, the reality 
of this participation in the Soviet government was hardly utopian. 
For Mikoyan, his loyalty to Moscow was often tested by his willingness to act 
against his fellow Armenians.  He had proven in Baku that he would not shy away from 
enforcing Soviet rule, once threatening a subordinate: “You should keep in mind whom 
you’re dealing with, and know that there’s a bullet in this gun for you!”79 However, he 
was tested in 1937 when Joseph Stalin sent him to Armenia with a list of about three 
hundred Party members to purge. Seeing a friend on the list, Mikoyan crossed off his 
name before signing the order of arrest. However, this man was arrested anyway along 
with seven out of nine Armenian Politburo members. In total, roughly one thousand 
people were arrested on this trip to Yerevan under ‘his’ orders.80  But this would not be 
the last time that Mikoyan would willingly carry out the commands of his Soviet 
superiors at the expense of his own conscience.  In 1962 Khrushchev wanted to send 
Mikoyan as an emissary to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, however his wife 
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Ashken was dying and he was reluctant to leave her.  The Soviet leader eventually 
convinced Mikoyan to go by promising that “if the worst comes to pass, we’ll take care 
of everything.”81 Ashken did pass away while her husband was in Cuba, but Mikoyan 
never confronted Krushchev about the incident.  So while there were many instances 
where Soviet Armenians participated in the communist regime, there were also many 
times when opposition members sought to distance Armenia from Moscow. 
 According to Ronald Grigor Suny, one of the most prolific scholars of Armenian 
History, there was no resistance to the introduction of Soviet rule, as the Armenians were 
a nation of victims: downtrodden, hungry, sick, and politically apathetic.82  But surely 
this is too simplistic a conclusion.  While it is true that the Soviets were seen by many as 
a preferable option to the encroachment of Turkey, some segments of the Armenian 
population refused to participate in communism and chose to emigrate from their 
traditional homeland in opposition to the Soviet administration.  The Dashnak party, 
leaders of the first independent Armenian Republic, had tried to persecute and suppress 
growing Bolshevik sentiment during their rule. Thus, they were no supporters of the 
communist regime. Many of their more radical members either left Armenia to fight for 
nationhood externally—contributing to the growth of the Armenian Diaspora and its 
increasing anti-Soviet narrative—or remained to establish violent opposition 
organizations against both Turkey and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it soon became 
apparent that Moscow had no desire to remove Turkish authority from traditional 
Armenian homelands in Eastern Anatolia.  Since Turkish nationalists were considered 
allies by the Soviets against Western imperialism, the Bolsheviks were willing to cede 
territory to maintain peace in the region.  This and other Soviet policies led to dissent 
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primarily among the Dashnaks, who established a stronghold in the Karabakh Mountains 
to fight the communists.  With the Red Army occupied elsewhere, civil war erupted 
between Soviet and non-Soviet Armenians in the early years of the Soviet Republic.  This 
history is often forgotten in the retelling of Armenian memories, since it sheds an 
unflattering light on the narrative of Armenian unity that was so rampant in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.      
 The territories of the Soviet Caucasus underwent much change in the 1930s, 
eventually transforming into present-day border configurations.  During this restructuring 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region located within modern-day Azerbaijan was given status as 
an autonomous region of the newly minted Azerbaijan Republic, as was Nakhichevan 
even though it was, and still is, separated from Azerbaijan by a strip of Armenian 
territory. And while Armenia was made a single republic without administrative 
subdivisions, most of its richest farmland and historically significant sites were now 
across the border in Turkey.83 These two Azerbaijani areas are great examples of Stalin’s 
policy of divide and rule. Nagorno-Karabakh had, and still has, an Armenian majority 
while Nakhichevan is primarily Muslim.  It was in the mountains of Karabakh where the 
dwindling Armenian nobility created strongholds against Persian rule in the eighteenth 
century.  This history of rebellion has followed the region and helps to shape its memory 
in the collective as an independent Armenian region.  However, much of the reason for 
Nakhichevan’s territory is due to a desire to placate Turkey over the fate of Muslim 
minorities in the South Caucasus.  Since the Ottomans had taken up the mantle of Muslim 
protector by the latter years of their reign in much the same way that Russia had taken up 
the mantle of protector of Eastern-Orthodoxy earlier, the Bolsheviks agreed to special 
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treatment for the Muslim areas of Achara and Nakhichevan in order to appease Turkey 
and neutralize it as a threat before the Red Army units had marched into Georgia and 
Azerbaijan in the 1920’s.84  This was most likely a purely politically motivated move on 
behalf of the recently empowered Bolsheviks.  At this time, they were more interested in 
consolidating power within Russia and her territories rather than continuing the external 
wars of the previous Imperial regime. 
 Following years of purges under Stalin’s regime, the 1950s and 1960s saw a 
relaxing of Soviet policies toward ethnic nationalism within the Armenian SR.  In order 
to appeal to the masses, the Party began to make concessions to traditional culture and 
sought to use it as a means to further communism rather than viewing it as a roadblock.  
Some pre-Soviet works of Armenian literature and folklore began to re-circulate at the 
official level.  However, a resurgence of ethnic nationalism was not much of a presence 
until the mid 1960s.  These expressions of Armenian-ness were neither anti-Soviet nor 
Anti-Russian, but largely anti-Turk.  On April 24, 1965, thousands of Armenians 
gathered in downtown Yerevan to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of what they 
consider the Armenian Genocide.85  Unofficial demonstrations and commemorations 
were held in Yerevan, which were surprisingly tolerated by the Soviet government.  This 
eventually led to the opening of a Genocide memorial in Yerevan in 1967, a nationalist 
and anti-Turk site of memory that would reinforce a national narrative of victimhood 
particularly after communist rule.  
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STATIST NARRATIVES AND ACTS OF SILENCING 
Both Tsarist and Soviet governments considered some ethnic groups loyal and 
cooperative while others suspicious, thus resulting in inconsistent policies and narratives. 
During the nineteenth century, religious identity was often used as a tool by Russia to 
determine the potential trustworthiness of non-Russian groups.  Due to this policy, Russia 
adopted the Orthodox Georgian and Armenian populations and assumed the mantle of 
protector of Christianity within the Caucasus.  At the same time, the Ottoman Empire 
used Islam to link itself with Muslims in the region. Eastern Anatolia, a melting pot of 
both Christian and Muslim populations, became the intersection of these strategies for 
control.  These competing narratives resulted in political divisions in Yerevan as it fought 
to establish itself as the center of an independent Armenian nation and defender of 
Armenian culture.  Parties within these Armenian communities disagreed over how to 
build the new country and cope with international tensions like border disputes. Thus, 
multiple narratives arose to reinforce competing opinions on the future of the Armenian 
nation.  This was further complicated by the introduction of Soviet ideology into this 
developing nation-state and its impact on evolving Armenian national identity.     
It is important to note that the rise of ethnic nationalism within the Soviet Union 
in the last half of its existence was in no way limited to the Armenian Soviet Republic.  
The de-Stalinization process begun in the Khrushchev era from 1953 to 1964, as well as 
various concessions to ethnic nationalism under subsequent leaders, led to increasing 
awareness of one’s identity and nationality divorced from Soviet ideology.  It is possible 
to distinguish two unique forms of nationalism within the Union: official nationalism and 
dissident nationalism.  Official nationalism allowed Republic elites to foster support for 
the Soviet regime by conceding to ethnic feelings of the majority within certain limits, 
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thus allowing for the existence of national pride, patriotic sentiments, and the use of 
national history and myths to further the Soviet cause and the construction of 
communism.86 Dissident nationalism, however, occurred when the expression of these 
sentiments exceeded the bounds of government limits.  Unlike other nationalist narratives 
at the time, Armenian sentiments were decidedly anti-Turk rather than anti-Soviet or anti-
Russian.  This allowed for leniency when handling Armenian nationalism since it did not 
represent a direct threat to Soviet rule and often reinforced the ‘little brother’ narrative of 
Russian protection that had been advanced since Russian interference in the Caucasus 
region beginning in the seventeenth century. However, this would change in 1988 with 
the outbreak of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Over the course of Armenian history, different competing notions of Armenia 
emerged as a result of the dispersal of Armenians throughout the world.  The existence of 
a growing diaspora community located far from historic Armenia led to ecclesiastical, 
dialectical, and cultural differences between the ‘Western Diaspora’—those who left—
and the ‘Eastern Diaspora’—those of stayed.  However, it is clear that Armenian memory 
for both those who remained in the region and those who left largely centers on memories 
of Eastern Anatolia and Ottoman persecution.  For those Armenians who dispersed 
throughout the Western diaspora, these memories of genocide dominate their identity and 
narrative. However for those in the Eastern diaspora, experiences of communism and a 
post-Soviet war with Azerbaijan prevent the collective memory of genocide from 
overshadowing their national narrative. Thus the challenge that this narrative faced was 
in creating new memories divorced from those in Turkey and existing outside of the new 
Armenian state.   
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Linguistic differences also contributed to the growth of divergent notions of the 
nation.  Two variants of the Armenian language, a branch of the Indo-European linguistic 
family, have developed over time.  The western variation is spoken in the Turkish, 
American, European, and Levantine Diasporas.  It significantly differs from the eastern 
variation spoken in the Armenian Republic, Iran, Russia, and among the populations 
originating in these areas but is still mutually understandable.  It should be noted that the 
Armenian language and alphabet is generally considered a source of pride for nearly all 
Armenians, thus another tool to be used to influence the entrenching of certain memories 
into the national narrative. The statist narrative up until the Soviet experience stressed a 
unification of Armenian identity along lines of nationalism and a shared Armenian 
history.  However, the fractured Armenian nation meant the existence of multiple 
individual and social memories that were difficult to synthesize into one larger collective 
narrative.  The genocide offered a shared point of reference around which to build this 
fabled, or imagined, collective narrative.  Thus, memories of trauma and victimhood at 
Muslim hands were emphasized at the expense of other memories in order to advance 
Armenian nationalism and self-rule. 
For much of Armenian society, especially the peasantry, the Armenian Church 
dictated traditional Armenian culture and was thus the source of one influential narrative. 
While the Church retained much influence over the Armenian people throughout the 
communist period, much of its political and social power had already been reduced by the 
rise of nationalist groups like the Dashnaks at the beginning of the 1920s.  The 
intelligentsia, a largely secularized group, had been hostile toward the Church.  
Nicknamed Anastvats (Armenian for ‘atheist’) while in seminary school due to his 
questioning of religious tenants, Anastas Mikoyan often opposed traditional narratives of 
Armenian society: “Our social customs were as archaic as our economy…. According to 
 54 
ancient custom a married woman did not have the right to speak to a man or woman older 
than she…but in those days tradition was tradition.”87 However, the majority of the 
population still looked to the Church for guidance. Due to the overwhelming loyalty of 
the Armenia peasantry, the Soviets were initially cautious in their condemnation and 
purging of the Church to a certain extent, choosing to ease into the denunciation and 
vilification of Armenian religion where before they would have come in swinging.  
However, the new government eventually appropriated property and traditional functions 
of the Church while especially anti-communist religious leaders were persecuted.  This, 
along with the indoctrination of Armenian youth through a Soviet education system, 
severely weakened the Church narrative of an Armenian identity based on religion and 
traditional culture within the Armenian Republic.   
One counter-narrative to the Church originated from the intelligentsia who used 
nationalism as a tool to reform traditional society.88 Incited and encouraged by memories 
of the genocide and Turkish pogroms, which were still fresh in the minds of nearly all 
Armenians in the twenties and thirties, communism allowed the nationalist narrative to 
maintain a strong anti-Turk narrative in Soviet Armenia.  Musicians singing of the 
tragedy that had befallen their beloved land were welcomed not only in villages but also 
by Party and Komsomol members.  Literature also played a large role in the continuation 
of these memories.  For Anastas Mikoyan, these nationalist writers figure largely in the 
memories of his formative years: 
 
“The story of the Armenian nation’s struggle against foreign oppressors 
fascinated me, and the historical novels of the Armenian writer Raffi—David-
Bek, Samuel, and others—made a deep impression on me.  Shaumian has called 
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Raffi one of the most beloved of Armenian novelists. I also delved 
enthusiastically into the works of one of the classic Armenian writers, Hovanes 
Tumanian…He was a great artist whose words vividly depicted the life of the 
peasants and the landscape of his native land.  I was especially drawn to his 
descriptions of the people and places of my own native region of Lori and I liked 
his use of the many words and expressions in our Lori dialect which, rather than 
spoiling the Armenian literary language, enriched it.”89 
Thus, collective memories of Armenian nationalist heroes like David Bek became 
ingrained in individual memory, helping to shape individual identities like Mikoyan’s.  
At the same time, those memories and identities provided a basis for the nationalist 
narrative, which in turn emphasized Armenian independence, heroism, and victimhood. 
In the late nineteenth century, political differences further complicated the 
national narrative.  Two major political parties—the Social Democratic Hunchak Party 
and the Armenian Revolutionary Federarion, or Dashnaks—were founded in Geneva in 
1887 and in Tiflis (now Tbilisi) in 1890, respectively.90  Both of these parties were 
members of the larger progressive movement that was developing in Russia and Western 
Europe at this time that typically combined ideas of social justice and class-consciousness 
with the power of national revival.  While they had the common goal to establish 
Armenian independence from Ottoman rule, these two Armenian parties differed on 
cooperation with non-socialist parties, the relationship between national and class 
struggles, and the tactics to be pursued in resolving the political status of Armenian 
communities in the Ottoman Empire and Russia. By the time of the Russian revolution, 
the Dashnaks had become the dominant party in Armenian communities.  Their authority 
over guerrilla groups in Eastern Anatolia was facilitated by battlefield victories during the 
early twentieth century against the Ottomans. Therefore, they assumed the mantle of 
defender of the Armenian national idea and became the leading voice in first Republic of 
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Armenia in 1918.  When the Bolsheviks took over in 1920, it was a huge blow to those 
Armenians whose personal histories had been tied to the Dashnak party. Other 
communities and political leaders like the Hunchaks continued to support Armenians 
wherever they resided and made peace with the new political rulers, focusing instead on 
the existence of an Armenian republic, even a Soviet one, as essential to the survival of 
Armenian identity.  The Dashnaks, on the other hand, saw Soviet rule as a catastrophe for 
the entire Armenian nation and to the survival and prosperity of Armenian national 
identity. Thus two opposing narratives clearly existed in tension with each other: an ultra-
nationalist version opposed to Soviet rule (promoted by the Dashnaks) and a more 
moderate version accepting of the new communist reality.  However, the primary statist 
narratives came from three sides: the Church, which held political power before the 
Soviet regime; the nationalists, whose rhetoric dominated Armenian politics and society 
during the first Armenian Republic from 1918-1920 before becoming an opposition voice 
under communism; and finally the Soviets, including those living in Russia as well as in 
the Republic who were masters at disseminating and imbedding their narrative through 
directed propaganda. 
  Arguably the most vital narrative in existence during the Soviet period originated 
from the Soviets themselves.  In order to transform society into a communist utopia, this 
narrative sought to instill communist ideology amongst Armenians in order to legitimize 
its mission. The Soviet statist narrative stressed the necessity of introducing modernity 
and Soviet ideals to the backward villages, for their evolutionary progress was held 
captive by bonds of religion, family, and village loyalty which could only be liberated by 
Soviet modernity, education, and gender equality.  According to Soviet mindset, 
“communism is a greater good than the freedom of any small group called a nationality. 
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Communism solves not only the economic but also the nationality problem.”91 To that 
end all mass communication in the Armenian Soviet Republic—radio, cinema, press, 
theater, and schools—was centralized in the Commissariat of Education and controlled 
by the Party, thus becoming major tools of Soviet propaganda.92 Interestingly, rather than 
fighting against Armenian culture, the Soviets used it to propagate their own agenda 
especially in the realms of language and the arts by encouraging diaspora Armenians to 
immigrate to Soviet Armenia.  Famous Armenian composers such as Aram Khachaturian 
aided the Soviet cause in such a way.  His ballets Spartacus and Gayane are perhaps his 
most well known along with the score “The Sabre Dance” from Gayane.  Another 
famous Soviet-Armenian was Alexander Tumanian, the architect responsible for the city 
planning of Yerevan and its transformation into a modern city. Asked, “if nationality is 
not important…why is it that all the leaders of the Armenian Republic are without 
exception Armenians?” the Commissar of Education of the Armenian SSR said: 
“Because they are of the people and know the customs and the language and the 
mentality of the people…The international outlook is the future ideal, not the immediate 
one…There is no reason why one group should impose its culture on another. If Russia 
was to impose its culture on Armenia I would be the first to fight it.”93 
This Armenian Soviet official illustrates that for him and those like him it was 
possible to be both Soviet and Armenian, but one’s Armenian-ness often trumped one’s 
Soviet-ness.   Or rather, one’s ethnicity was never supplanted by a decidedly Russian 
culture. Before his 1959 visit to the United States, the “Soviet Union’s shrewd trader” 
Anastas Mikoyan was credited in an American newspaper as a “‘talented…energetic 
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Armenian’” and “‘a powerful force in guiding the Russian economy’” who was proud of 
his mercantile ancestry and often toasted with fellow Caucasian Joseph Stalin, “‘to hell 
with these bloody Russians.’”94 So while the Soviet narrative was undoubtedly strong 
during this era, it was unable to completely eliminate deeply ingrained memories of 
traditional Armenian society, culture, and history.  These elements of Armenian identity 
were maintained and would rise to the fore again near the end of the communist regime. 
As long as the Soviet narrative did not infringe too much on this sense of identity, many 
Armenians were content to live within the system. In fact, when Russia did begin to 
impose its culture on Armenia most notably by attempting to remove Armenian as the 
sole official language in the Republic in 1978, Armenians took to the streets in opposition 
of Soviet power and successfully guaranteed that the sovereignty of their language would 
be left untouched.95 Interestingly, Armenia along with Georgia and Azerbaijan were the 
only Soviet Republics allowed to retain the language articles in its 1978 constitution. 
Thus, language can be treated as an important site of memory used to reinforce whatever 
statist narrative in power at a specific time.   
As a primary means of communication, language in the form of rhetoric and 
labels is often used as a tool of propaganda whether intentional or not. “I should 
say…that my father was not in fact a peasant, but a laborer-carpenter.  In those days, 
however, people were classified on official documents in terms of one of the three 
estates: noble class, inhabitants of cities and towns, or peasantry, rather than according to 
class and occupation.  Since my grandfather had been a serf and my father lived in the 
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country, he usually listed himself as peasant.”96 Mikoyan’s remembrances of class 
stratification in pre-Soviet Armenia demonstrate the role that labels and rhetoric can have 
on the acts of remembering and self-classification. The immediate post-World War II 
period saw a flurry of renaming due in large part to migration and repatriation of diaspora 
Armenians beginning in 1945.  Between 1946 and 1948, nearly 90,000 Armenians from 
the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas immigrated to Soviet Armenia.97 In addition 
to the massive influx of Armenian immigrants, a process of emigration was occurring for 
Azerbaijanis residing within Armenian borders.  In another example of Stalin’s divide 
and rule policy, Azerbaijanis who had lived in Armenian lands for generations were 
‘voluntarily’ moved to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.  Another bout of renaming 
emerged in 1967, most likely connected to a surge in Armenian nationalism incited by 
the 1965 Yerevan demonstrates in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Armenian Genocide98.   
CONCLUSION:  RESURGENCE OF ARMENIAN NATIONALISM 
 Considered the “Vicar of Bray of Soviet politics,” Anastas Mikoyan was one of 
the most successful Armenians within the Soviet Union.  A Russian saying referring to 
his position within the upper echelons of the Soviet regime goes: “From Illich [Lenin] to 
Illich [Brezhnev] without accident or stroke.” His ability to avoid the purges endemic 
within the Politburo prompted one official to describe him as able to “walk through Red 
Square on a rainy day without an umbrella [and] without getting wet.  He could dodge the 
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raindrops.”99 Mikoyan finally succumbed to illness in 1978.  While he did not witness the 
eventual collapse of the Soviet Union or Armenia’s shift toward independent statehood in 
1990, he was able to witness the initial reemergence of Armenian nationalism in the late 
70s and 80s that would eventually foster a rejection of communism in the final years of 
the great Socialist experiment.  This development was a counter-movement against 
Soviet efforts to control and shape Armenian identity by selectively reinforcing certain 
narratives and forgetting others. It was also due in large part to the breakout of conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which 
in 1989 declared its intent to rejoin the Armenian Republic. After many years of 
assimilation into Soviet society, the general Armenian community in Russia was not 
overly concerned with establishing independence, but it did support the Republic’s split 
from the Union in 1990 and its war against Azerbaijan. 
Before the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Armenia declared independence on the 23rd 
of August in 1990 by a parliament largely controlled by the anti-Communist opposition.  
The new president, Levon Ter-Petrosian, was a former literary historian and leader of the 
Karabakh Committee—a dissident movement that arose in the late 1980’s against the 
Soviet leaders and which was committed to reunifying Nagorno-Karabakh with the larger 
Armenian Republic.  However, this new president followed a more moderate line than 
other, more radical opposition groups at the time.  Because of this he was considered 
week by nationalist groups like the Dashnaks, who had managed to survive throughout 
the Communist regime by relocating outside the borders of Soviet-controlled Armenia.   
In 1991, massive protests erupted in Yerevan calling for his resignation, and the newly 
restored state experienced one of the considerable issues splitting larger Armenian 
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identity and the fate of the new republic: the split between Soviet Armenians and 
diaspora returnees, especially those who sympathized with the nationalist party.  
 Throughout the Soviet period of Armenia’s history, collective memories of a past 
steeped in tradition, exceptionalism, trauma, and victimhood were continually evoked in 
order to remain imbedded in the heart of Armenian identity.  While a strong Soviet statist 
narrative attempted to usurp traditional and nationalistic counter-narratives, it failed to 
completely eradicate pre-Soviet memories devoid of communist ideology.  However, the 
soviet experience did ultimately impact Eastern Armenian identity formation by 





Chapter 3:  Reclaiming the Past and Shaping Post-Soviet Identity 
On August 23, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Armenian Soviet Socialist 
Republic submitted a Declaration of Independence:  
 
Expressing the united will of the Armenian people;  Aware of its historic 
responsibility for the destiny of the Armenian people engaged in the realization of 
the aspirations of all Armenians and the restoration of historical 
justice; … Exercising the right of nations to free self-determination;  Based on the 
December 1, 1989, joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the 
Artsakh National Council on the "Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the 
Mountainous Region of Karabakh;"  Developing the democratic traditions of the 
independent Republic of Armenia established on May 28, 1918.”100  
Armenia’s official secession from the Soviet Union in 1990 did not result in an 
ideological or cultural vacuum amongst its citizenry, but rather the rejection of 
communism was a result of a reclaiming and reinvention of an identity based on ideals 
that were able to survive throughout the Soviet regime that began in Armenia in 1920. 
This reinvented identity is largely based upon an amalgamation of narratives that had 
been allowed to develop near the end of Soviet rule due to an intensification of ethnic 
nationalism and the contribution of various sites of memory that worked to emphasize 
and disseminate narratives of a glorious Armenian past. The increased importance placed 
upon this past—their literature, music, myths, and heritage—reflects a desire for 
independence, autonomy, and self-determination as well as a renewed effort to forget or 
reimagine a history of ‘victimhood.’ Collective memories of Armenia’s past for the 
majority of those living in Russia differs very little from those living in the recently 
emancipated Republic of Armenia in the years directly following the breakup of the 
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Soviet Union.  As time passed, though, the bond between the identities of these two 
groups would widen and stretch but never completely sever.   
 In the socio-political vacuum that once was communism, a multi-faceted national 
narrative rooted in a triumphant past, trauma, and nationalism once again established a 
strong presence in the Armenian state by relying on a revival of traditional values of 
religion and culture while invoking a sense of victimhood from past regimes and a desire 
for self-rule.  As flocks of Armenians converged on the new Republic from diaspora 
communities across the world, the Dashnaks set themselves up to grasp the political 
reigns with the help of international funds.101  They built media outlets, businesses, and 
began to invest Western funds into this economically struggling post-Soviet country.  
Furthermore, the money they brought with them and their promotion of political 
candidates set them up to wield considerable power.  However, this worried those who 
had been living under the Soviet regime.  The communist experience had instilled in 
those Armenians within the Soviet Union a different idea of what Armenia and 
Armenians should be. Nurtured in soviet ideology from a young age, there still existed a 
large population not entirely opposed to communism.  Furthermore, the opposition 
members who remained in Soviet Armenia felt they had more claim on the their 
country’s future than those who left.  Their memories had been altered by the Soviet 
experience and new ones introduced that were absent from the social memories of the 
Western diaspora.  This created a distinct, post-Soviet identity to which the Diaspora 
could not relate.  The social memories of those who emigrated or grew up outside of 
Armenia dwelt in nostalgia for a past that would never be again, while those nurtured 
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under the Soviet Union accepted that concessions and negotiation were necessary for the 
future survival of the Armenian state as a bastion of Armenian identity 
RESURGENCE AND RISE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM  
 In 1970 ethnic Armenians made up 88.6% of the Soviet Republic of Armenia, 
with Azerbaijanis constituting 5.9% of the population and Russians another 2.7%.  By 
1989 these numbers had changed to 93.3%, 2.6%, and 1.6% respectively.102  The 
concentration of ethnic Armenians within this Republic, along with increasingly 
sympathetic Soviet policies, contributed to a growing sense of ethnic nationalism in the 
later years of the communist regime.  However, there was also a disproportionately larger 
population of Armenians outside the borders of the Republic.  The largest of this group 
was situated in Russia. The resurgence of nationalism amongst Armenians both in Russia 
and at home contributed to a post-Soviet identity at once shaped by memories of a 
glorious Armenian history and mired in memories of trauma and dependence. The 
abundance of historic images, myths, and heroes in Armenian literature, music, and 
popular culture of this time period speaks to a sense of nostalgia for a triumphalist past.   
 The ability to claim ancient heritage in the region serves as a tool to legitimize 
Armenian statehood while encouraging national myths of past glory and triumph. At its 
greatest extent, the ancient Kingdom of Armenia stretched from the Caspian Sea to the 
Mediterranean between 95 and 66 BC.  The history of the Armenian people is said to 
trace back even further to the ancient Urartu Kingdom situated around the Armenian 
territories of Lake Van and Lake Sevan from 860 to about 590 BC. These memories of 
Armenian greatness and the heroes of the past have become ingrained in this national 
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myth, which is reinforced by the state through museums, national dance companies, and 
plays and operas that repeat these narratives.  At the same time a vein of vulnerability 
runs through Armenian identity. Because of the strategic geographic location of the 
Caucasus as an intersection of East and West interests, many empires have striven to 
exert influence in this area:  Greek, Roman, Persian, Ottoman, Arab, Russian, and most 
recently American.103  These various influences have left an indelible mark on the psyche 
of the modern Armenian nation by engendering feelings of victimhood and dependence.  
This is most apparent in the anti-Turk nationalist narratives of the Soviet and post-Soviet 
era. 
 Remembrances of Turkish pogroms against Armenians have been handed down 
generation to generation since their occurrence beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. 
This has resulted in a ‘chronosophical’ paradigm wherein these memories inhabit the 
collective’s consciousness by transcending the past to live in the present.104 A Young 
Turk policy of relocating and purging suspect elements of the Turkish population resulted 
in the deaths of roughly 1.5 million Armenians between 1914 and 1924.  This period, also 
known as the Armenian Genocide, is arguably the most significant event that has 
occurred in the history of the Armenian people and has come to dominate Armenian 
politics in the region due to Turkey’s refusal to recognize the event as ‘genocide’ rather 
than ‘consequences of war.’ It is so important that the second to last point of the 1990 
Armenian Declaration of Independence declares that “the Republic of Armenia stands in 
support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in 
Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”105 However, this traumatic event often 
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overshadows other memories of life under Ottoman rule as well as other assaults on the 
Armenian way of life and, in turn, often silences them. 
 In post-Soviet Armenia, memories of prosperity under Muslim rule are often not 
spoken, as they fail to coincide with the dominant narrative that colors Turkey as evil. 
For the majority of Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire, life until the mid-
1800s was generally self-governed and incident-free.  Their roles as merchants and 
businessmen allowed for a trans-border movement, interaction with foreign cultures, and 
the accumulation of wealth. In addition, Ottoman policy generally allowed ethnic 
minorities like the Armenians a level of autonomy and the ability to practice their own 
religion and culture.  This level of freedom and prosperity is often forgotten in the anti-
Turk rhetoric of the national narrative.  In addition to these silenced memories of relative 
peace, non-Genocide reminiscences of persecution that reinforce memories of trauma are 
often overlooked.  For example, other instances of persecution by late Ottoman policies, a 
1905 massacre in Baku, instances of purges and assault under Soviet rule, and other 
traumatic events are often overshadowed by emphasized memories of the genocide and 
typically lumped together as an amalgamated point of reference for an identity based on 
victimhood.  In a post-Soviet reality in which Armenia is often vulnerable to economic 
and security concerns, memories that evoke a narrative of victimhood are often 
suppressed unless they serve political interests or are forced to be remembered by an 
external diaspora that does not usually experience those same concerns. 
 The discussion of ‘victimhood’ at the hands of the former Ottoman Empire 
naturally leads to a discussion of Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh question.  
Determined to create a strong state and a secure future, the conflict over the Nagorno-
Karabakh separatist region of Azerbaijan adds another dimension to the rise of 
nationalism and belief in self-determination. While those in Armenia proper participated 
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the most in the fighting against Azerbaijani forces and suffered the most under wartime 
conditions in the early years of the 1990s, the Diaspora community in Russia was by no 
means unaffected.  Their brothers, sons, and cousins fought as well, thus their memories 
both of victimhood and valor encouraged a sense of Armenian pride and fraternity. 
 On February 20, 1988, the largely ethnic-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region of 
Azerbaijan voted to officially reunite with Armenia, thus igniting open conflict in the 
Southern Caucasus that ultimately resulted in an ongoing, unresolved dispute between 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The eruption of armed confrontation between the 
mostly ethnic Armenian Karabakh region and Azerbaijan was one of the primary factors 
for Armenia’s devastated economy after the fall of the Soviet regime. Since its 
landlocked position meant that about 85% of Armenia’s cargo and goods arrived via rail, 
Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s railway and air blockade against Armenia practically crippled 
the economy quite early in this conflict.  “The blockade had a significant negative effect 
on the already fragile economy of Armenia, since Armenia imported 80 percent of its fuel 
from the USSR, of which 82 percent was produced by Azerbaijan.  Furthermore, 
Azerbaijan also cut the deliveries of oil and gas from Russia and Kazakhstan.”106 In 1993, 
Turkey joined Azerbaijan and initiated its own blockade against Armenia in support for 
their Turkish-speaking brothers in Azerbaijan, thus closing its shared border with 
Armenia and cutting off access to tradition Armenian territories and sites of memory in 
Eastern Anatolia.  Russia managed to broker a cease-fire in 1994, but Armenia and 
Azerbaijan continue to clash over the largely unresolved issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
The borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed after more than a decade.  
This continues to be a contentious issue for the region today.  But more importantly, this 
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conflict reignited memories of trauma and resulted in a desire to overcome a psyche of 
victimhood and dependence.  Therefore, memories of an historic Armenian past full of 
glory and triumph were evoked on a national level in order to increase Armenian 
nationalism and hope for a peaceful, secure future. 
NARRATIVES IN TENSION 
The pre-Soviet era had witnessed the rise of a distinctly nationalist narrative that 
promoted the unification and consolidation of a fractured Armenian identity based upon 
memories of a shared Armenian religion, language, and culture.  The goal of this 
narrative, largely promoted by a growing intellectual class, was to establish statehood for 
the Armenian people in the ‘traditional’ or ‘historic’ Armenian homeland.  This 
nationalist group experienced brief success with the formation of the first Republic of 
Armenia in 1918.107  However, while this narrative still existed in some form in 1990, 
experiences of the collapse of communism and war over Nagorno-Karabakh significantly 
affected the original national narrative and shifted its purpose from a unifying and state-
building tool to one focused on survival and prosperity. 
The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh continues to color relations in the region. 
However, Armenia was not without allies.108  Largely due to the efforts of its widely 
dispersed and influential global diaspora community, many nations have backed Armenia 
in its quest for two primary goals: the resolving of the Nagorno-Karabakh question and 
the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The largest of these Diaspora communities—
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located throughout Russia—has not been as vocal as other groups from Europe or 
America in its denunciation of Turkey. This is in large part due to its closer ties with the 
community in Armenia and their shared communist past. The conventional, widely 
accepted, state-supported post-Soviet narrative claims that due to their religious 
similarities, geographical nearness, shared communist past, and the geopolitical realities 
of the region, Russia and Armenia have historically enjoyed a close, mutually beneficial 
relationship. However, alternative narratives exist that depict Russia as an overbearing, 
abusive big brother smothering Armenian progress.  In an effort to reestablish legitimacy 
for self-rule and secure a future for a people with a long history of victimhood, there 
existed in the final hours of the Soviet Union a necessity to reclaim a triumphant past. 
Not only was communism losing its ideological grip on the Armenian people, but rising 
trouble with Azerbaijan also largely affected Armenian-ness by causing memories of 
insecurity and fear to resurface. 
While genocide recognition and memories of that trauma still inhabited the minds 
of those in Russia and Armenia, interestingly they were more willing to negotiate with 
Turkey in order to normalize relations in the region and open the borders between the two 
countries.  Since these communities live under economic and geopolitical hardships due 
to their isolationist state and inability to easily access foreign markets, a statist narrative 
promoted by the Armenian government calling for economic prosperity through 
stabilization with Turkey began to circulate.  This narrative also includes the 
condemnation of an overdependence on Russia for Armenia’s future survival as well as a 
sense that the real threat lies to the East in Azerbaijan rather than from Turkey.  The 
supplanting of memories of the Armenian-Azerbaijan War, and the ‘Dark Nights’ that 
followed, in the minds of ‘eastern’ Armenians resulted from lived experiences to which 
other social groups within the larger Armenian community could not relate.  This speaks 
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to the existence of different priorities of the state and its need to promote a national 
narrative that does not depend on the Western Diaspora for its survival.  
Another narrative that existed in Armenia and was shared with those communities 
in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union was one promoted largely by the 
Armenian Church and adopted by the state to order to promote ‘traditional’ culture 
devoid of communist influence.  This Church narrative centers on the importance of the 
Armenian-Apostolic religion and its status as the first state religion of Christianity in 301.  
This is an extremely important source of pride for nearly all Armenians throughout the 
world and places prominently in Armenian identity.  In addition, the Armenian alphabet 
has likewise been venerated as an example of Armenian literary and artistic heritage.  
Created in approximately 405 by Mesrop Mashtots—an early Armenian religious figure 
and eventual saint in the Church—the history and significance of the Armenian alphabet 
has become an indelible factor in what it means to be Armenian.  Children are taught that 
each letter has a specific religious meaning attached to it, thus promoting the continuation 
of the Church in the national narrative.  
The juxtaposition of official statist and religious narratives at the time of the late 
Ottoman period with those of the immediate post-Soviet period illuminates how the 
collective memory of Armenia has changed over time.  During the Soviet period, the 
Church was largely silenced by a statist narrative that promoted religious tradition as 
harmful to a nation in need of modernization that only communism could provide.  
However, this narrative was ultimately unsuccessful in eradicating traditional Armenian 
memories and identity.  Whereas the pre-Soviet national narrative stressed an Armenian 
statehood based on the unification of fractured Armenian communities under the 
umbrella of the traditional memories, the immediate post-Soviet national narrative largely 
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focused on the survival of Armenian sovereignty and the right of self-determination 
through the use of anti-Turk, anti-Azerbaijani, and pro-Russian memories. 
SITES OF MEMORY AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE 
 The use of sites such as memorials, monuments, statues, and other significant 
indicators of an historic event or person are often used as a tool by the state to evoke 
memories within the collective that support the statist narrative.109   The Armenian 
Church has typically used architectural structures and religious iconography to evoke 
memories of its legitimacy and to reinforce its narrative.  One of the most arresting sites 
in the capital city of Yerevan is the modern-looking Saint Gregory the Illuminator 
Cathedral.  Its construction was begun after end of Soviet rule and stood (and remains) as 
a symbol of the 1700th anniversary of the proclamation of Christianity as the State 
Religion in Armenia.” In addition to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of historic 
medieval Churches throughout Armenia, the dotting of khachkars—or stone crosses—
across Armenia’s landscape serves as a reminder its Christian heritage.  Furthermore, the 
existence of alphabet ‘yards’ that illustrate the Armenian alphabet serve as sites of 
memories of Armenia’s literary tradition. Other sources of memory can be found at the 
Genocide Memorial and Museum, Matenadran (an institute dedicated to the preservation 
of ancient Armenian manuscripts), statues of Armenian literary and historical figures, and 
the renaming of place-names to honor historic Armenian figures and events serve to 
reinforce nationalism in the statist narrative.  It is also important to note that the Russian 
language is still widely spoken and seen everywhere in Armenia as a result of its 
inclusion into the Soviet Union. 
 Another important tool used by the statist and alternative narratives to evoke and 
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foster the remembering of strategically significant memories centers on the use of 
language and rhetoric.  In effect, language acts as a uniting agent can be used to 
manipulate acts of remembering; specifically, what is encouraged to be remembered and 
what is encouraged to be forgotten.110 The prolific renaming of roads, parks, and 
buildings after the end of communism illustrates how various groups actively sought to 
reclaim sites of memory and associate them with a narrative focused on a past free of 
oppression. The Soviet modernization of the eastern dialect of the Armenian language 
and the act of renaming under the communist regime was used as a tool of selective 
forgetting for the purpose of asserting Soviet power and to reinforce statist narratives. 
The use of Russian as an official language is also important to understand to what extent 
Armenians adapted and assimilated into Russian-Soviet culture. The changing of place 
names and the construction of soviet lieux de memoire (place names) had an impact on 
the formation of Armenian identity through strategic use of social and collective 
memory.111 
 The use of national place-names ensures historical continuity and the preservation 
of cultural traditions while holding special meaning for small stateless nations since it 
alone identifies their national territory.112 “The conscious use of place-names by a state 
can be seen as an instrument to preserve the unity and uniqueness of the nation; to 
enforce in the national consciousness its moral right to inhabit a particular territory; to 
protect its land from the territorial claims of its neighbors; or to justify its own territorial 
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claims.”113 Arguably the most significant motivation for the alteration of place-names in 
Soviet Armenia was connected to the Soviet Union’s need to erase backwardness by 
introducing modernity and changing the cultural landscape of its empire. Pre-
revolutionary toponymies were often reflections of religious, imperial, or bourgeois 
culture.  In Armenia especially, these place-names evoked memories of Armenian 
religious figures, heroes, monarchs, historical territories, and culture. Such naming was 
“alien to the Soviet consciousness, and (moreover) some [had] unstable and even 
derogative meaning.”114 For example, the common suffix –vank is Armenian for 
‘church.’  Since religious symbols were especially singled out by the Soviet regime, these 
were some of the first place-names to be changed.  Thus, Kodukhvank became Koturvan.  
Soviet re-designation of these lieux de memoire often followed a typical pattern.115  
Tradition religious names were often replaced by the new religion of the Soviet Union 
(Marxist-Leninism), Soviet figures often replaced those leaders and heroes of the former 
culture, and officially celebrated individuals replaced the names of historical territories 
that typically carried the name of a noble or land-owning family.116 The renaming and 
naming process in the Soviet Republic of Armenia was tightly controlled by Moscow.  
First, the new name would have to be approved by The Geographic Commission of the 
Armenian Academy of Science.  It was then passed on to the Presidium of the Armenian 
Academy of Science before moving on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Armenian SSR.  The final stage of this process was the Presidium of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet.117  Thus the location and meaning of such sources of memory were used by the 
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regime as a tool of propaganda.  However, this method for propagating a specific 
narrative was not limited to the use of the state.  Larger social groups often changed 
place-names to reflect present socio-cultural realities.   
 It is important to keep in mind that these place-name alterations did not only 
result in new Russian or Soviet names.  Many toponyms with Turkic roots were replaced 
by their Armenian equivalency in response to growing anti-Turk sentiment after the 
genocide.  For example,  -gel/-gől (Turkish for ‘lake’) was often changed to –lich, its 
equivalent in the Armenian language.118 In fact, the majority of the alterations were 
surprisingly changed to Armenian rather than Soviet to reflect the population of the era.  
However, these new Armenian names were exclusively neutral, Soviet-Armenian names 
and never had religious connotations.  As mentioned previously, geographic distinctions 
such as ‘lake’ were often changed from a Turkic root to an Armenian root.  On the other 
hand, respected and well-known Soviet-Armenians (as well as Soviet-Russians) were 
honored in similar fashion.  Anastas Mikoyan and Stepan Shaumian—two well-known 
Armenian Bolsheviks—lent their names to places such as Anastasavan and Stepanavan; 
latter was known as Jalaloghlu (Turkic for ‘son of Jalal’) until 1923.119  From 1837 to 
1924, the modern-day northern Armenian town of Gyumri was known as Alexandropol, 
but was changed to Leninakan in commemoration of Lenin during Soviet rule from 1924 
to 1990. Thus, renaming in effect relocated collective memory in accordance with 
whatever narrative was proclaimed at the time.  The changing of Soviet and Russian 
place-names to Armenian names was likewise a tool employed by the newly independent 
state to re-appropriate ‘Armenian-ness’ and to reinforce the statist narrative.  Many place 
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names with obvious Soviet connotation were changed to reflect Armenian nationalism.  
However, sites bearing the names of prominent Soviet Armenians such as the Marshall of 
the Red Army and hero of World War II (Bagramyan), the famous Soviet-Armenian 
architect responsible for the modernization of central Yerevan (Tumanian), and the 
famous Soviet-Armenian composer Khatchaturian were left unchanged.  In addition, 
Russian-neutral names like ‘Moscow’ and ‘Pushkin’ likewise remained. 
CONCLUSION  
As flocks of Armenians converged on the new Republic from diaspora 
communities across the world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an ultra-
nationalist narrative set themselves up to grasp the political reigns with the help of 
international funds.  They built media outlets, businesses, and began to invest Western 
funds into this economically struggling country in order to further their narrative for the 
future of Armenian statehood.  The money these diaspora groups, primarily from the 
West, brought with them and their promotion of political candidates set them up to wield 
considerable power in the struggling state.  However, these members of the larger 
Armenian collective also brought with them new memories from their host countries that 
did not necessarily support the narratives of those who had remained in the region.  The 
presence of these Western ideals worried those who had been living under the Soviet 
regime.  The communist experience had instilled a different idea of what Armenia and 
Armenians should be.  Nurtured in soviet ideology from a young age, there still existed in 
Armenia a large population not entirely opposed to communist ideology as long as it did 
not interfere with the continuation of Armenian culture.  Furthermore, the opposition 
members who remained in Soviet Armenia felt they had more claim on its future than 
those who left. This created a distinct, post-Soviet identity to which the Diaspora could 
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not relate. The social memories of those who emigrated or grew up outside Armenia 
dwelt in nostalgia for a kingdom that would never be again.  Thus, there was a real fear 
that “western” Armenians would seize control of the new republic and lead it in an 
extremely foreign direction. 
Interestingly, it was the appointment of Robert Kocharian, former president of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, as Prime Minister that signaled the domination of the state not by the 
Western Diaspora, but by the Eastern one.  Instead of Westernized businesses and 
political leaders directing the future of the Armenian legacy, politicians, businessmen, 
and war veterans from controversial region of Nagorno-Karabakh would decide the fate 
of the nation.120  This has resulted in post-Soviet foreign and domestic policies that are 
unwilling to negotiate the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan on any terms other 
than their own.  When Levon Ter-Petrosian—Kocharian’s predecessor and first president 
of the new Republic of Armenia—was forced from his position because his willingness 
to negotiate a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question with Azerbaijan deemed him 
unacceptable in the eyes of the controlling members of the state, Kocharian came to 
power and replaced him as president in 1998.  The ability of Armenia’s competing 
narratives to find common ground has resulted in the continuation of collective memories 
of an historic past and a multi-faced collective identity based not only on religious, 
linguistic, and cultural traditions, but also one seeking to remove itself from a cycle of 
victimhood and dependence.    
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Conclusion 
Understanding eastern Armenian’s identity—how they perceive themselves and 
what is most important to them—is necessary to understand the geopolitical culture of the 
Sothern Caucasus region as a whole.  For it is this identity and its preservation that 
motivates the Republic of Armenia to make certain policies that agitate for measures that 
will either improve or threaten the stability of this region. The fall of the Soviet Union 
greatly altered the geopolitics of the Southern Caucasus by allowing previously 
subjugated ethnic peoples to emerge as independent nations on the international stage.  
However, regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Russia still try to assert their own 
influence into the region, and now America has joined the fray.  For Russia, its interests 
lie in the potential threats to the security and territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation, as well as an area in which to forward its own strategic economic and 
geopolitical goals.121  
Narratives based on memories of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the 
Armenian Genocide have come to dominate Armenian identity in both the Diaspora and 
in Armenia-proper.  And while there does exist a disparity among different social groups 
within the larger collective concerning which events and memories are recalled most 
often or most vividly, these two topics are central to the Armenian people as a whole and 
the Republic of Armenia, which claims to represent them, when interacting with both 
Russia and the West.  Today, Armenia could be considered Russia’s strongest ally in the 
Southern Caucasus.  Because Armenia has such poor relations with its neighbors Turkey 
and Azerbaijan, it continues to look to Russia for security and economic stability.  Russia 
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is even allowed to maintain a military base in Armenia, supposedly as a deterrent to 
Turkey, and has extended its lease until 2044.  Due to its geographic location and 
conflicts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia relies heavily on Iran and Russia for its 
energy supplies.  The country also relies on a large diaspora to bolster its economy 
through remittances in the form of donations, the construction of infrastructure, the 
rebuilding of churches, and foreign investment.  This translates to a heavy dependence on 
external powers for economic and energy survival.  Most of Armenia’s energy is 
produced from fuel (mainly gas and nuclear fuel) imported from Russia.  Because 
Armenia depends on external sources for materials and supplies of energy, the unresolved 
issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and the effects of ongoing conflict with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan have devastated Armenia’s economy.  However, economic reform and the 
introduction of new sectors, such as information and communication technology, have 
resulted in steady economic growth for Armenia since 1995. Though, it is still one of the 
worst economies in the world according to Forbes.122 
This seemingly necessary dependence on Russian support makes up a large 
portion of Armenia’s modern-day national, statist narrative and is used by the state to 
justify Russian interference in Armenian affairs.  However, a large counter-narrative 
exists which claims that Armenia’s dependence on Russia and Russian domination in 
Armenia’s affairs hampers its independence.  One reason for Armenia’s pro-Russian 
leaning could be due to decades of Armenian-Russian relations.  Another reason could be 
that the Soviet Union’s rule transformed relations between the two states into one of 
servant and master, disfiguring the self-consciousness of Armenian identity.  A third 
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school of thought claims that without Russia’s protection, both historically and presently, 
Armenian would not exist.   
According to one source, Armenia’s ties with Russia represent large financial 
opportunities that are largely responsible for the steady growth of Armenia’s economy.123  
Under former president Robert Kocharian, Armenia has been largely loyal to Russia.  
This might have something to do with the large numbers of Armenians living there.  
However, there is also a large Armenian Diaspora across the globe.  While Russia is 
home to the largest Armenian population outside the Republic of Armenia, estimated to 
be around 1,130,500124, the United States hosts the second largest population of 
immigrant Armenians, which is estimated to be 484,840.125  This gives Armenia another 
avenue to pursue in its search for economic growth and regional security.  In a relatively 
recent article, Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan is claimed to have said that “there are 
1400 enterprises with Russian capital operating in Armenia with US$3 billion investment 
portfolio, which tends to increase.”126  Furthermore, both Armenia and Russia have 
implemented many joint programs in economic and humanitarian fields; especially 
important is the negotiation on the construction of a new energy unit of the Armenian 
Nuclear Power Plant.  Russia’s influence in this region may not be as strong as it once 
was, but its strategic and economic interests have not waned.   
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Then again, some critics claim that Russia has hijacked Armenia through its 
“equities for debt” policy.127 In 2002 Armenia and Russia signed an agreement that 
forgave Armenia its $98 million debt to Russia in exchange for a controlling stake in at 
least four Armenian enterprises.128  In a separate exchange, Armenia handed over state 
owned enterprises to Russia in order to pay off debts on Russian state credit.129  This has 
led to Russian control of about 80 percent of Armenia’s energy sector and twenty-five 
years of management rights to the new Iran-Armenia gas pipeline.  Some think this 
makes Armenia too dependent on Russia.  For Russia this is a huge advantage for its 
interests in the Southern Caucasus, as it allows for continued influence in Armenia.  This 
is especially important since Russia angered Azerbaijan by selling arms to Armenia in 
2008.130 
 As Armenia looks for ways to boost its economy and strengthen its security 
within the region, the question of European Union membership is bound to arise.  There 
is a lot of interest among Armenian politicians and the general public about eventual 
membership.  And though former President Robert Kocharyan kept Armenia tied to 
Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (an alliance between Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia), future leaders might lean 
towards the West and the European Union in the future.  In fact, the framework for EU 
membership already exists in Armenia with seemingly much public support, particularly 
among an increasingly civic-minded, educated youth. 
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 Armenian identity has changed and evolved over the course the history of the 
Armenian people, and it will continue to alter as Armenians are confronted with new 
experiences and paradigms.  Seeds of ethnic nationalism aimed primarily against an 
Islamic authority existed among certain populations of the Armenian community long 
before Europe is considered to have birthed nationalism in the late eighteenth to early 
nineteenth centuries.  However these seeds, sown predominantly by an intellectual and 
noble elite, and the nationhood they sought would not come to fruition until almost a 
century later.  Delayed by decades of Soviet rule and the introduction of communist 
memories, this nationalistic narrative that seeks the continuation of Armenian culture and 
society reemerged in the waning years of the Soviet Union.  With the help of memories 
founded on an historic past of triumph and exceptionalism, post-Soviet narratives 
ultimately attempt to re-appropriate a past in order to counteract other memories and 
narratives steeped in victimhood and trauma, thus endeavoring to forge a new self-
determining path for the Armenian people.  
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